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Transliteration System
The IJMES (International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies) transliteration system will be
followed throughout this thesis for Arabic words and names:
ʾ (except initial), ā, b, t, th, j, ḥ, kh, d, dh, r, z, s, sh, ṣ, ḍ, ṭ, ẓ, ʿ, gh, f, q, k, l, m, n, h, w/ū, y/ī.
Short vowels, tāʾ marbūta, alif maqṣūra, and definite article: a, i, u, a/at, ā, al-.

For Hindustani and Urdu words and names, IJMES does not provide a transliteration scheme.
The transliteration style of the Library of Congress will involve complexity for the limited use
of Hindustani and Urdu terms. To avoid such complexity, we will follow the Persian
transliteration scheme of IJMES:
ʾ (except initial), ā, b, p, t, s̱ , c, ch, ḥ, kh, d, ẕ, r, z, zh, s, sh, ṣ, ż, ṭ, ẓ, ʿ, gh, f, q, k, g, l, m, n, h,
v/u/ū, y/ī.

Words and names that have a widespread common form will be provided with a scientific
transliteration only the first time they appear.
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Introduction
In the year 1939, the Dissolution of Muslim Marriage Act was enacted to make divorce easier
for women. However, no change in the law of instant ṭalāq was made to restrict the arbitrary
power of man to divorce. Instead, such instantaneous divorce was recognized by the courts in
British India. For Instance, in the case of Rashid Ahmad v. Anisa Khatun, the Privy Council
gave its verdict stating that the triple ṭalāq becomes valid and irrevocable instantaneously when
it is pronounced.1 This form of instant divorce has been practiced in the Indian subcontinent
for centuries and has caused a great deal of hardships to many Muslim women. To keep a check
on such kind of instantaneous divorce, excessive dower was introduced in India to make
divorce too expensive for husbands, since dower was usually paid either on divorce or death.
The practice of excessive dower was probably introduced in the late medieval period. Sudha
Sharma says that the dower price was not so high and was easily payable by the husbands at
the beginning of the medieval period. However, in the later period, the amount of dower
became expensive beyond the reach of husbands to pay.2 The exact period is uncertain but was
prevalent during the reign of Mughal emperor Akbar. Abū al-Fażl ibn Mubārak (d. 1602) writes
about Mughal emperor Akbar’s disapproval of inflated dower, “The king disapproves of high
dower, as they are rarely ever paid, but he admits that fixing of high dower is preventive against
rash divorces.”3
Supporting the view of inflated dower as a useful device, Sharafi,4 in her article, “The Semiautonomous judge in colonial India: Chivalric imperialism meets Anglo-Islamic dower and
divorce law,” argues that “Inflated dower and delegated divorce reduced the power asymmetry

1

Rashid Ahmad v. Anisa Khatun, ILR 4 ALL (1932), 52.
Sudha Sharma, The Status Muslim Women in Medieval Period (New Delhi, California, Singapore: Sage
Publications Ltd., 2016), 112.
3
Abū al-Fażl Ibn Mubārak, The Ain Akbari, vol. 1, trans. H. Blochmann (Calcutta: The Baptist Mission Press,
1873), 278.
4
Mitra Sharafi is a modern historian of legal history of South Asia. She obtained her degree in law from the
University of Oxford and Cambridge. She also holds her doctorate in history from the Princeton University,
USA.
2
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inherent in Islamic marriage law. The two mechanisms made the husband’s power of talāq too
expensive to use, or extended the same power of talāq to his wife by delegation.” To prove her
claim, she argues that British judges used these two mechanisms to protect Muslim women
against the arbitrary power of men to divorce. According to her, the legislation of English rule
was the practice of excessive dower due to the Oudh Laws Act of 1876, which allowed the
courts to reduce the inflated dower within its province. However, this law was not applicable
in the three major presidencies of Calcutta, Bombay, and Madras. Thus, Sharafi states, “The
colonial judges pretended to apply Anglo Muhammadan law as it appeared in their law books;
instead, they fashioned their own law in order to better the lot of Muslim wives.” In other
words, colonial judges departed away from the colonial legislation and Anglo Islamic law to
crystallize the rights of women against the excessive authority of men. She states that the
inflated dower is un-Islamic, according to Hanafi School. As a result, the judges ignored this
Islamic opinion about inflated dower and considered it reasonable. Thus, the judges
pronounced rulings in favour of a high amount of dower to protect the women against the
arbitrary power of men to divorce them instantly. Besides inflated dower, she further argues
that ṭalāq al-tafwīḍ (delegated divorce) as a stipulation in the marriage contract allowed the
women to divorce their husbands without their consent, and was encouraged by the British
judges. To prove her claim, she uses the court judgments of 19 leading cases related to dower
and divorce from the colonial period between 1855 to 1924.5
In my opinion, there are several weaknesses inherent in Sharafi’s submission. The major
drawback of her argument was that she firstly selected only leading cases of dower and
delegated divorce from the case files of Indian Appeals to Privy Council, Indian Law Reports,
and some weekly reports. There-in, she selected only some essential cases, whose judgments

Sharafi, “The Semi-Autonomous Judge in Colonial India: Chivalric Imperialism meets Anglo-Islamic Dower
and Divorce Law,” Indian Economic and Social History Review 46 no. 1 (2009): 57-81.
5
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were favourable to women. Secondly, she failed to admit the fact that the abolition of the office
of Muslim legal experts from the colonial courts had a negative effect on the distortion of
Islamic law. Sometimes, colonial judges preferred colonial legislations over Islamic law,
claiming that English law guaranteed greater justice, equity for the appellants. However, certain
court records point otherwise. For example, in some cases, Muslim women were deprived of
their right to dower for delaying in filing their suits in the court, even though it was clearly
expounded by Muslim legal experts that there was no time limit for demanding one's right to
dower. J. F. Stephen (d. 1894), who was a British legal historian, judge, and reformist of
criminal law in India, evidently notes that “Justice, equity and good conscience… practically
speaking, these attractive words mean little more than an imperfect understanding of imperfect
collections of not very recent editions of English textbooks.”6 According to him, “British
judges were supposed to act according to justice, equity and good conscience in the absence of
written codes of legislations. However, these untrained lawyers were handicapped by an
imperfect understanding of the intricacies of the law.”7 Besides, she did not deal with the
subject of divorce extensively. She left out the issue of khulʿ divorce, which was extremely
difficult for women to obtain in order to get out of their undesirable marriages in the early 20th
century of colonial India. One of the only ways she could use to dissolve her marriage was
through apostasy. Hence, there was a rise in the dissolution of Islamic marriages through
conversion.
The thesis will attempt to investigate whether excessive dower and divorce law did help
Muslim women and the British judges enhanced their rights to dower and divorce. The study
will also examine the court practices and application of Muslim personal law by non-Muslim

Scott Alan Kugle, “Framed, Blamed, and Renamed: The Recasting of Islamic Jurisprudence in Colonial South
India,” Modern Asian Studies 35, no. 2 (April 2001), 280.
7
James A. Colaiaco, J. F. Stephen and the Crisis of Victorian Thought (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1983),
102.
6
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judges. We shall analyze the judgments of the court cases of dower by colonial judges to know
if the Muslim personal law was practiced within the spirit of the Islamic law. To do so, the
methodology of the study will attempt to analyze a wide range of court cases related to dower,
such as cases on divorce, interest on dower, apostasy, restitution of conjugal rights, and so on.
The mix of various cases around dower will also determine both the theory and practice of
Islamic law in colonial courts. The thesis will take into account around forty cases of dower
from the colonial courts of British India, during the period between 1800 to 1939.8 Our study
of the rights of women based on the court cases of dower will not be studied in isolation but
will take into consideration their relation to other instances of divorce (khulʿ and delegated),
apostasy, restitution of conjugal rights, and interest on dower and so on. Therefore, the cases
are randomly chosen without giving preference to any leading cases on dower, which shares
similar trends of favouring women in the court judgments, as Sharafi did.
In order to garner an understanding of the milieu our thesis is concerned with, we shall give a
cursory view and background of the relationship inherent in marriage with regards to Indian
customs and Islamic heritage, and the complex dynamics played by Muslim personal law and
colonial judiciary with regards to the cases of dower in relation to marriage and divorce. We
shall also explore the development of the colonial judiciary briefly to make us familiar with
the judicial system in Colonial India.
In the first chapter, the meaning and concept of dower will be discussed from the perspective
of the Qurʾān and the Ḥadīth. This will examine the concept of dower against the backdrop of
an idea of dower as compensation to have sexual intercourse, and describe it from the
perspective of Qurʾān and Ḥadīth, that though dower (mahr) is considered to be a gift, it is not

8

The year 1939 was very significant due to the enactment of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriage Act, which
provided Muslims with the prescriptions of law to follow while obtaining a divorce. This Act of Dissolution of
Muslim Marriages was vital for women due to the reforms brought in Islamic law, paving the way for Muslim
women to get a divorce, which was otherwise almost impossible, except through apostasy.
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purely a gift, but a mutual exchange of something, arising as a result of a marriage contract
made freely between two parties.
The second chapter will engage in the discussion of inflated dower so as to investigate if the
commonly accepted norm of the practice of excessive dower introduced in India to prevent
instant divorce served as a check against the husband's unilateral authority to divorce. The
debate on excessive dower will address some of the questions, such as did excessive dower
give protection to women against divorce? Did it protect women against an undesirable bond
of marriage? Did colonial judges work to better the lives of Muslim women through verdicts
in their favour? Besides, we shall discuss the social dynamics around dower between women
and their relatives and heirs in the process of obtaining one’s right to dower.
In the third chapter, we shall discuss some of the violations of Islamic law concerning dower
in British India. For Instance, there were violations of Islamic law through the implementation
of payment of interest on dower, application of the law of limitation, the precedence of customs
over the law. This will expose us to the sad reality of caste discrimination among Indian
Muslims. Furthermore, we will see a glimpse of a cultural practice of freeing husband from
dower debt, seen as a virtuous act, and the application of the law of limitation, which deprived
women of their rights to dower. This discussion will open our eyes to the reality of some of
these practices, which were clear violations of Islamic law, and was unfavourable to women in
their rights to dower.

Cursory View of the Cultural Background of Colonial India
The diversity of India was undoubtedly tremendous. The difference in culture, customs,
traditions, language, food, clothing, religion, and environment was found across the
subcontinent. In a multi-religious country, Hindus, Muslims, Christians, Buddhists, Jains, and
Sikhs had lived for centuries in close proximity influencing the lives of one another socially,
religiously, politically, and economically. Change in religion brought about some change but
5

did not wholly take away the cultural practices and traditions of one’s place. For Instance, the
customary practice of widow burning (Sati)9 among high castes, female infanticide, female
seclusion (Purdah system) existed among a certain group of Indians, irrespective of their
affiliation to a faith. Jawaharlal Nehru, the first Prime Minister of India, recounting the culture
of the masses through his travel across India narrates,
Everywhere, I found a cultural background which had exerted a powerful influence on
their lives. This background was a mixture of popular philosophy, tradition, history,
myth, legend, and it was not possible to draw a line between any of these. Even the
entirely uneducated and illiterate shared this background. The old epics of Ramayana
and Mahabharata were widely known among the masses, and every incident and story
and moral in them was engraved on the popular mind and give a richness and content
to it.10
The reciprocal amalgamation of culture and tradition among the people of diverse faith was
evident in the way people lived their lives. In other words, the difference between a Muslim
and a Hindu was not so much about religious affiliation but geographical, i.e., to say, a Bengali
speaking Muslim was much closer to a Bengali Hindu than a Punjabi Muslim in his way of
life.11 In the caste-based society of India, the upper-caste Muslims were mostly descendants of
the ruling class from the Mughal Empire. The mass population of Muslims were converted
from the lower caste of Indian society, who were counted among the poorest and
disadvantaged.12 Conversion to Islam did not take away their deep-rooted cultural practices.

Sati was a Hindu custom in India, whereby a widow sacrificed herself at dead husband’s pyre either by force or
voluntarily. The woman who immolated herself along with her deceased husband was considered a Sati, i.e. to
say, a chaste woman or faithful wife. The practice of Sati was considered to be highest expression of wife’s
faithfulfulness or devotion to the deceased husband. In other words, the practice of Sati was known to be a
meritorious act, as it was believed that burning of widow along with her dead husband guaranteed both the place
in heaven. This practice was abolished in 1829, however its practice did not disappear immediately after 1829,
and now its practice is very rare. Such practice existed especially among the upper castes and it was not widespread, as it is often thought.
10
Jawaharlal Nehru, The Discovery of India, (Delhi, Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 67.
11
Ibid., 334.
12
Ibid., 345.
9
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In the 19th Century, the influence of the West on Indian society was enormous. In the short
span of about 50 years of rule, the British were able to introduce a new outlook of thinking,
tastes, and preference for western things and more into the Indian way of life.13 Rajan writes,
After four centuries of Muslim rule and less than a half-century of British rule
Hinduism -‘this mighty banyan tree,’14 as Swami Vivekananda called it - was stirred
in its depths by the reforms introduced by the British and by the criticism of the
Christian missionaries. The foremost leader of this movement of Indian protest and
reform was the great Raja Ram Mohan Roy (1772-1833), who stood for preserving the
past but also absorbing useful features of the West.15
Raja Ram Mohan Roy, having been influenced dramatically by Islam in his early life and later
by Christianity up to some measure, worked vehemently to eradicate some of the deplorable
practices within Hinduism. His advocacy and agitation against Sati contributed largely to its
abolition by the British Government in 1829.16 In the early nineteenth century, when middleclass Hindus were much more open to western education and reform movements, elite Muslims
kept themselves aloof from the influence of the West. One of the possible reasons for their
aloofness from the West was due to the deep-rooted resentment for being thrown out of power
by the British.17 It was only towards the end of the nineteenth century, Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan
(1817-1898) promoted western education with his ardent desire to reform Islam through the
study of modern science and technology. Thus, he founded a Muslim college for men in 1877,
where Islamic theology and modern science could be taught with the western system of
education.18

M. S. Rajan, “The Impact of British Rule in India,” Journal of Contemporary History 4, no. 1 (Jan. 1969), 97.
For Swami Vivekananda, the Hinduism was like the banyan tree, which provides shade and protection to all
without distinguishing anyone on the basis of their caste, colour and religion. He founded the Ram Krishna
Mission in the year 1897, to promote unity of religions and service of humanity irrespective of caste, class, colour
and religion. The followers of this reform movement believe in one God and hold that all the religions lead to the
same eternal reality.
15
Rajan, “The Impact of British Rule in India,” 91.
16
Nehru, The Discovery of India, 315.
17
Bharati Ray, “A Voice of Protest: The Writings of Rokeya Sakhawat Hossain (1880-1932),” in Women of
India: Colonial and Post-Colonial Periods, vol. IX, part 3, ed. Bharati Ray (New Delhi: Pauls Press, 2005),
428.
18
Dushka Saiyid, Muslim Women of the British Punjab: From Seclusion to Politics (London: Palgrave
Macmillan, 1988), 42.
13
14

7

However, concerning women’s education, he believed that they should be schooled at home.
He held the view that once men are educated, the education of women would follow
consequently.19 Moreover, according to him, if men are educated, they would restore the rights
of the women, which have been denied over time.20 Nehru says that Sayyid Khan’s influence
was mostly on the upper-caste Muslims. The masses of the Muslim population, who were
converts from lower caste Hindus, were alienated from upper-caste Muslims and continued to
remain far closer to their Hindu masses in their way of life.21
Rokeya Sakhawat (1888‒1932)22 was one of the earliest feminists in colonial India. She wrote
articles and books in Bengali (except for the book titled Sultana’s Dream in English) calling
women to wake up and fight for their rights,
Mothers, sisters, daughters! Come, get up, and leave your comfortable beds; go
forward. The muʾaḏḏin (an official who calls Muslims for prayer) calls you, can you
not hear him, the summons from Allah? Do not laze in your beds, the night is over, it
is now dawn, and the muʾaḏḏin is calling the faithful for prayers. Elsewhere in the
world, the women have woken up; they are protesting against all social evils. Women
have risen to become Education Ministers; there are now women doctors,
philosophers, scientists, generals of the army, writers, poets, etc. And we women of
Bengal are in a deep slumber, in a dark and damp room.23
Through her writings, she attacked the women seclusion (Purdah system) and the patriarchal
structure of the society. She advocated for gender equality in the right to education, work, and
dignity of life. Her words suggest that she was ahead of her time.24 Though she had some

19

Ibid., 82.
Ibid., 44.
21
Nehru, The Discovery of India, 345.
22
She was born in an upper-caste Muslim family of a distinguished landlord in the northern region of Bengal
(present-day Bangladesh). Her father never allowed her to go to school and opposed her learning Bengali or
English, as Bengali was considered a language of the commoners. Her father and other relatives favoured the
Urdu or Persian since it was said to be the language of the Muslim elites. However, Rokeya had a greater interest
in the Bengali language, which was spoken by the majority of Bengali Muslims. To her fortune, her brother, who
was educated in St. Xavier’s College, Calcutta, supported western ideas of Syed Khan and taught her sister to read
and write.
23
Ray, “A Voice of Protest,” 443.
24
She sought for women certain things, which seemed unrealistic during her time in the sub-continent, but her
words are becoming a reality in a certain sense. For Instance, in modern history, all the three countries, India,
Pakistan, and Bangladesh have had women Prime Ministers heading the country, and presently, it is once again a
woman, who is the Prime Minister of Bangladesh. However, she made no mention of class divides between upper
caste and lower caste and addressed the upper or middle class of her community.
20
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limitations, she stands out to be a voice and role model for many Bengali Muslims.25 Rokeya
also spoke on the crucial issue of injustice done to women through a one-sided divorce:
Marriages in our community are contracted with the consent of both the bride and the
bridegroom, as laid down by the tenets of our religion. That being so, God forbid, if
there has to be a divorce, then surely this must also be with the mutual consent of both
the husband and the wife. But in reality, that is not so; it is entirely a one-sided story,
only the husbands being allowed to divorce. I have known many instances of marriage
break-ups among middle-class families of north Bengal, and it is always the husbands
separating from their wives on flimsy grounds.26
The law on divorce in India was favourable to men. The practice of instant divorce by men was
prevalent in India for centuries. According to which, a man could divorce his wife instantly on
pronouncing ‘divorce’ three times, and she was divorced irrevocably. In case of such divorce,
the husband must pay the dower to his wife if it was unpaid during the continuance of their
marriage. The 'dower' or bride-wealth is a fixed amount of money stipulated in a marriage
contract to be paid by the groom to the bride, which consequently becomes her property.
Moreover, the law states that dower is the sole right of the woman, and she has the right to
either give it up or relinquish it during the continuance of the contract. When the husband
divorces his wife, he is obliged to pay the unpaid dower or part with her justly.
In terms of divorce, women had limited options for divorce. The woman had the choice of khulʿ
divorce, according to which she initiates divorce through negotiation with her husband, who
consents to divorce her in exchange for compensation. However, this option of divorce also
gives room for the manipulation of a wife: A husband could treat his wife with vindictiveness
so that she initiates khulʿ divorce and forfeits her dower. He does this by forcing his wife to
surrender her whole dower in exchange for his pronouncement of ṭalāq. Khulʿ divorce is
entirely dependent on men and is unfavourable to women. The law also provides women the
option of delegated divorce (ṭalāq tafwīḍ), according to which the husbands delegate the

25

The information is taken from the introduction of the book edited by Bharati Ray, Women of India: Colonial
and Post-Colonial Periods, xi.
26
Ray, “A Voice of Protest,” 447.
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authority to his wife in the marriage contract that if he breaches the contract of marriage, she
can dissolve the marriage. However, the law of ṭalāq tafwīḍ is stringent on women; they should
use their delegated authority of divorce instantly on the knowledge of the breach of contract
unless it is specified in the contract that women can divorce whenever they choose to do.
At the dawn of the twentieth century in Colonial India, when it was almost impossible for
Muslim women to get out of their undesirable marriage, helpless women began to use apostasy
as a device to annul their marriage, as apostasy automatically dissolved the marriage. During
the years between the 1920s and 1930s, the cases of apostasy among women increased, and it
became a significant concern for Muslim ʿulamāʾ (“scholars,” singular ʿālim) to bring reforms
in the Islamic law. In the year 1933, a well-known Muslim jurist, Thānvī, passed a fatwā
(“juridical consultation,” plural fatāwā), according to which apostasy did not dissolve the
marriage automatically.27 Instead, he held that Hanafi law allows the muftī (“deliverer of formal
legal opinions,” plural muftiyūn) to take recourse to Maliki School to dissolve the marriage in
case of utmost necessity. He agreed that Muslim women could ask for judicial divorce due to
the failure of the husband in his marital obligations of maintenance, long absence, cruelty,
mental instability, and so on.28 However, such judicial divorce was possible only at the
discretion of Muslim qāḍī (“judge,” plural quḍāt). This option, too, was unattainable, since the
colonial courts did not have an exclusive office for Muslim qāḍī. For the application of Islamic
law in a strict manner, the Muslims demanded the Government for the appointment of Muslim
judges in the courts.29 Finally, ʿulamāʾ’s reform efforts through the call of Jamʿiyyat ʿUlamāʾ
al-Hind for the legislation of Islamic law was enacted as the Dissolution of Muslim Marriage
Act in 1939. This Act did not fulfil the particular demand for Muslim judges in colonial courts.

Ashraf ʿAlī Thānvī, al-Ḥīla al-Nājiza li-l-Ḥalīla al-ʿĀjiza [in Urdu], (India: Maktabat Rāżī Deoband, n.d.),
326; Muhammad Qasim Zaman, Ashraf ʿAli Thanawi (Oxford: One world Publications, 2007), 62.
28
Ibid., 63-64.
29
Muhammad Qasim Zaman, The Ulama in Contemporary Islam: Custodians of Change (Princeton and Oxford:
Princeton University Press, 2002), 27.
27
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Still, it brought about a reform in the Islamic law of divorce, whereby apostasy was no longer
legitimate for the dissolution of marriage and provided Muslim women several grounds for
juridical divorce, such as impotence, failure of maintenance, lethal disease, habitual
mistreatment, immoral life of the husbands, etc.30
Moreover, according to the Dissolution of Muslim Marriage Act of 1939, a woman’s right to
dower does not get affected by the dissolution of marriage.31 Court records show that the
fixation of dower in India was often expensive beyond the reach of husbands to keep a check
against their unilateral power to instant divorce. However, the amount of the dower was also
dependent on the status of the family and the customary practice of the family or the place.
Ameer Ali states that in India, among Indian Muslims of the parallel position of an upper
middle class of British society, the dower varied between Rs. 4,000 to 40,000 (£400 to 4,000).
While in lower Bengal, the former, and in Bihar, the latter was a customary amount of dower.
The dower of lower-class Muslims was between Rs. 25 and 400 (£2,10s. and 40). And the
dower among the princely families was fixed in several Lacs (1 Lac = Rs. 100,000).32 In my
survey of court cases, I discovered that majority of the case reports on dower were amounting
to over Rs. 20,000 (£ 2,000) up to several Lacs. Abhinav Chandrachud says that the amount of
Rs. 20,000 was a hefty amount during the nineteenth century.33 It is most likely that the
majority of the cases were from the blend of upper-middle-class families, elites, and princely
families, which can be inferred from the court descriptions such as the customary practice of

Zaman, Ashraf ʿAli Thanawi, 63; Muhammad Khalid Masud, “Apostasy and Judicial Separation in British
India,” in Islamic Legal Interpretation: Muftis and Their Fatwas, eds. M. K. Masud et al. (Cambridge,
Massachusetts, London: Harvard University Press, 1996), 196.
31
The Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939 is taken from the book compiled by M. M. Aliyar, Muslim
Personal Law: Applied by Courts of Justice in India (Ernakulum: Pioneer Offset Printers, 2019), 347-349.
32
Ameer Ali, The Personal Law of the Mahommedans (London: W. H. Allen & Company, 1880), 304.
33
This was the sum required by an Indian student to study in England for the duration of three years. See,
Abhinav Chandrachud, An Independent Colonial Judiciary: A History of the Bombay High Court During the
British Raj, 1862-1947 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2015), 25.
30
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high dower among respectable families34, members of the royal family35, and the lady of a
respectable family.36 Moreover, Justice Mahmood states in the court records that “Poor class
of Muslim families hardly come to the courts for judicial justice.”37 Yet, it cannot be wholly
denied that the practice of high dower did exist in India to protect women against instant ṭalāq
(divorce) by husband, as we read in the court records.38
Concerning prompt (payable at marriage or on demand) and deferred dower (payable on
divorce or death), Ameer Ali states that it was customary in India to fix half the dower as
prompt and the remaining half as deferred dower. However, Muslims had options to make
stipulations. It was a general practice among Indian Muslims to allow deferred dower of a large
amount unpaid in order to compel husbands in fulfilling the terms of the marriage contract
completely.39 In other words, a large dower was left unpaid so that the husband would think
twice before executing a divorce due to his obligation of paying it. Unlike Ameer Ali, Thānvī
says that both prompt and deferred dower were generally paid or received after divorce or death
of the spouses among Indian Muslims.40 It implies that the whole dower was often unpaid until
the dissolution of marriage. Even though Thānvī did not mention that excessive dower was
fixed to keep a check against the husband's arbitrary power to divorce, it is more likely that it
was done so, as the whole dower was often allowed to remain unpaid until the dissolution of
marriage. In other words, the amount of dower in India was often deferred to be paid at divorce
or death to make the husband’s unilateral power of instant ṭalāq an expensive affair.
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In the classical legal texts of the Hanafi School, it is stipulated that the minimum amount of
dower is ten dirhams (the equal value of Rs. 4). There is no limit in assigning the maximum
amount of mahr, which could be fixed by the woman herself since it is her right.41 Thānvī (d.
1943), one of the prominent religious scholars of the twentieth century, writes, “The woman
has the right to stipulate the dower and can specify the dower as high as she wants. However,
it is unreasonable to stipulate a very expensive dower.”42 I agree with the opinions of Akbar,
Tyabji, and Thānvī that expensive deferred dower is rarely paid and is often oppressive and
unreasonable. Thus, it raises unanswered questions: Was expensive deferred dower a useful
device to protect women against instant ṭalāq? Was it easy for women to obtain their right to
dower either on divorce or death of their husbands? Did it (dower) really protect women
against undesirable marriage?

Background of Judicial System
Give me the words of the Koran… and out of them, I undertake to produce a code.
- Jeremy Bentham

The Mughal administrative system was officiated by two important high ranking officers,
namely nawāb and dīwān. Nawāb acted as the head of the government and military with the
responsibility of maintaining law and order in the province; whereas, dīwān was the head of
the Dīwānī, who was not only responsible for the collection of the revenues, but also for
deciding cases related to income and other civil matters43. In the year 1765, the British East
India Company acquired authority from the Mughal emperor Shah Alam; in return, the
Company promised him annual pay.44 Following this arrangement, the Company became
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responsible for the collection of revenues, and the administration of justice (criminal and civil)
was passed on to the British officers. In the beginning, the quḍāt continued with the
responsibility of administering justice, but new changes were introduced since 177245 since the
primary concern of collecting revenues and making profits did not meet its expected ends.46
Moreover, there was no proper system of a judicial order, thus leading to a chaotic situation
due to the cruelty and oppression by the Company officers.47
The British administrators, in particular Warren Hastings, the governor-general of Bengal,
realized that application of English laws to Indians would establish disorder in the judicial
system, and such a foreign policy would be complicated to apply to the natives.48 Jain rightly
says, “Warren Hastings very well realized that for a proper collection of revenues there should
be peace and order in the country, and this to a great extent depended on a fair and effective
administration of justice. Thus, he established the judicial system in 1772, not only for the
collection of revenues but also for a proper administration of justice in the country.”49 Under
the Judicial plan of 1772, the legislation was passed by Hastings, “in all suits regarding
inheritance, marriage, caste and other religious usages and institutions, the laws of the Quran
for the Mohammedans, and those of the Shastras for the Gentoos (Hindus), shall be invariably
adhered to.”50
Under Hastings’ scheme for the administration of justice, courts were set up in each district as
mofussil diwani (mufaṣṣil dīwānī, civil) and a mofussil foujdari (mufaṣṣil fawjdārī, criminal)
court. The collector, who was an English civil servant, was responsible for the collection of
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revenues. He, too, worked as a judge in the former court (civil court), and a Muslim judge
presided the latter (criminal court) under the supervision of the collector. Above these courts
were Sudder Diwani Adalat (Ṣadr Dīwānī ʿAdālat, the civil court of appeal) chaired by the
Governor and his council, and Sudder Foujdari Adalat (Ṣadr Fawjdārī ʿAdālat, the criminal
court of appeal) was carried out by Muslim judges under the supervision of the Governor and
his councils for appeals from mofussil courts. Besides, there were some small cause courts for
the speedy hearing of minor cases.51
Under the reforms brought by Lord Cornwallis as governor-general between 1786 to 1793,
additional changes were made. Under Cornwallis’ leadership, the Islamic criminal justice
system was considered too harsh and the mofussil foujdari (criminal) court as corrupt, which
led to the introduction of circuit courts in Patna, Calcutta, Murshidabad, and Dacca.52 Foujdari
courts (criminal) were replaced by circuit courts to deal with the criminal offence of all sorts.
It was imperative to note that in this instance, it was no longer a Muslim judge who presided
under this new system of criminal justice. Instead, civil servants of the Company acted as
judges, even though they were untrained in English law nor Islamic jurisprudence, and muftiyūn
and quḍāt assisted them.53 The provincial courts of appeals were set up just below sudder
diwani adalat. Likewise, munssiff's (munṣif) courts were established below the mofussil diwani
court.54 High ranking jobs in the districts were occupied by the Indian Civil Servants of British
origin.55 In the hierarchy of courts, British administrative officers usually held important
positions in the higher courts, and the natives were employed to work in the lower courts.56
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During the early period of British rule, the judges of the colonial courts were not lawyers, so
the Hindu pundits and Muslim law officers were sought to assist them through their opinions
or interpretation of the law.57 However, the British officials were unsatisfied with the
administration of justice and questioned the authenticity of the law interpreted by the Muslim
law officers and Hindu Pundits. One of the prominent orientalists, linguistic and the judge
under East India Company, namely Sir William Jones (d. 1794), remarked, “Pure integrity is
hardly to be found among the pundits and Maulvis, few of whom give opinions without a
culpable bias. I, therefore, ask them to produce original texts and see them in their own
books.”58 He, therefore, demanded the creation of the complete digest of Hindu and Islamic
laws, so that British judges could rely more on the law texts than the law officers. And some
of the most authoritative books were translated for the exclusive use in administering legal
justice. They are al-Marghīnānī’s (d. 1196–97) Hidāya (Charles Hamilton translated it from
Persian text to English in 1791), Sirāj al-Dīn Muḥammad al-Sajāwandī’s Kitāb al-Faraʾiḍ alSirājiyya (translated into English in 1792).59 About fifty years later, some parts of Fatāwā
ʿĀlamgīrī was translated into English by Neil B. E. Baillie, as Moohummudan Law of sale
(1850), The Land Tax of India (1853), A Digest of Moohumudan Law (1875). Another Shīʿī
law book Sharāʾiʿ al-Islām of al-Muḥaqqiq al-Ḥillī from the Jaʿfarī Shīʿī School, was partially
translated into English by Bailie as The Digest of Mohummudan Law (1869)60. The project of
legal texts was nothing more than a step forward towards complete governance of the
judiciary.61 However, the office of legal experts in the courts was not replaced immediately
after the translation of the legal texts. The British judges still had to depend on the Indian legal
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experts, as they did not know the local laws and customs, and not all of them could be found
in the translated legal texts.62
After the Mutiny of 1857, the Company rule ended in India, and in the year 1861, the British
Parliament passed an Act to establish High courts for the administration of justice. 63 The Act
came into effect in the year 1862, establishing High courts in Calcutta, Madras, and Bombay.
The High Courts replaced the Supreme Court of the Crown and the sudder adalats, and the
new court absorbed all its documents, records, and judges.64 During the British Raj (18581947), there was an increase in the number of lawyers in the colonial courts. However, many
civil servants continued to work as judges in the courts.65 These civilians did not hold any
degree in law, but the study of law was a part of their syllabus for joining the Indian Civil
Service. After their arrival in Bombay, they had to take some legal courses at law school and
pass through the departmental test to secure a high ranking office in the courts. Surprisingly,
all the barristers in Bombay too were not graduates in law, as the degree in law was not a
requirement for being called to the Bar in England.66 Gandhi, who went to England to obtain a
degree in law to be a barrister recounts, “A student was required to fulfil two conditions before
being called to the Bar. The first condition was to ‘keep terms’ meaning to say that one had to
attend six out of about twenty-four dinners in a term, and there were twelve terms in total,
equivalent to about three years. The second condition was to pass two examinations, one in
Roman law, the other in the common law.”67 He further says, “I could not see then, nor have I
seen since, how these dinners qualified the students better for the Bar. The curriculum of the
study was easy, barristers being humorously known as dinner barristers. Everyone knew that
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the examinations had practically no value.”68 It is evident that barristers and civilians serving
as judges of the colonial courts had zero training on Islamic law or Hindu law. Hence, it can
be implied that colonial judges would have had a very different understanding of these laws,
even when Islamic laws were expounded to them. Yet, they were the ones who passed verdicts
with the help of local legal experts on the appeals from Muslims and Hindus, especially in the
higher courts. The project of translations of Classical legal texts and codifications of law started
by Jones continued, and we have seen that by the 1860s, different classical legal texts with an
authority of legal code were translated to enable British judges to pass verdicts without any
assistance taken from the local legal experts. Therefore, the office of both Muslim law officers
and Hindu pundits were abolished in the year 1864. Now the judges of the colonial courts
became the sole adjudicators of resolving any grievances brought by the natives.69 With the
abolishment of the office of legal experts, the plaintiff and the defendant could hire lawyers to
represent them, get legal assistance, argue on their behalf and challenge the judgment by
appealing to the higher courts.70 Highlighting the seriousness of abolishing the office of
Muslim legal experts from the courts, and replacing them by someone with no training on
Islamic law, Zaman says,
The development of the new ‘Anglo-Muhammadan law’ was undoubtedly not the
ʿulama’s legal tradition but a hybrid of certain legal classics and English common law,
as they were not part of this development. And ʿulamas could only continue to function
as muftis in giving fatwas on behalf of a particular madrasa, after having been stripped
from the most distinctive aspect of their vocation of interpreting the law.71
Such was the political and judicial milieu surrounding Colonial India, during the period from
1800 to 1939, which our court data used in this thesis are concerned with. Concerning the
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independence of the judiciary from the government, Crown courts and the supreme courts used
to police the administration of the company rule. After the end of the company rule in 1858,
the colonial government directly came under the Crown and the British Parliament. Thus, it
was no longer the judiciary, which was to enforce checks and balances on the government.72
Yet, the relationship between the judiciary and the administration was not free from scrambles
and disputes. For instance, in the year 1910, the High Court judges received insults from the
Governor of Bombay at the public event and were refused to stand by his right as per the
customary practice.73 Generally, the courts in British India adjudged the majority of the routine
criminal cases independent of the government.74 The verdicts on political cases like that of
Tilak and Gandhi often favoured the government.75 Bal Gangadhar Tilak (d. 1920)76 and
Mahatma Gandhi (d. 1948)77, the nationalist leaders of the freedom movement, were sentenced
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to sedition charges78 for their advocacy for complete independence from British rule and their
dissent against the British government. Such political decisions favorable to the government
were perhaps due to the selfish-interest of the judges to receive favors from the government or
their shared ideological beliefs.
Interestingly, the occurrence of sensitive political cases was a scarce phenomenon in the day
to day court hearings. Therefore, the judiciary gained the reputation of being independent of
the government.79 However, it would not be wrong to hold a bridging view that colonial courts
enjoyed some measure of independence from the government in all cases, inclusive of sensitive
political matters.80 In this work, we will be dealing with the civil issues of dower, whose
juridical decisions were independent of the government.
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Chapter One
Concepts and Meaning
Mahr is a spontaneous gift and honour to be presented by the husband to the wife on marriage
with a willing heart; by doing so, he makes a manifestation of his love for the wife and
eagerness to respect her rights to his fullest possible capacity.
-Wani, M. A

The chapter will discuss the meaning and concepts of mahr from the viewpoint of the Qurʾān
and the Ḥadīth. It will explain the obligatory nature of mahr in Islamic marriage from the lance
of the Qurʾān and Ḥadīth with the assertion that dower is an essential bridal gift or reward
offered by the bridegroom to the bride graciously only within the context of marriage. We shall
argue against the extreme feminist view of the bride-wealth as compensation for sexual
intercourse, and explain that it is an obligation on the part of the bridegroom to hand over the
nuptial gift to the bride as a requirement of marriage. The chapter will also deal briefly with
different kinds of mahr, and will finally present the secondary literature review.

Meaning of Mahr
Robertson Smith is of the view that the Arabic word mahr is synonymous with the Hebrew
word mōhar due to its payment to the damsel’s father (Dt. 22:29) and the Syriac mahrā, which
Bar ʿAli defines, “Whatever the son in law gives to the parents of the bride.”81 Smith sees the
use of these terms as ‘purchase price.’ However, the biblical word mōhar appears to have a
variant meaning. It was not so much to do with purchase price82 but compensation at the loss
of a helper (Ex. 22:16-17; 1 Sam. 18: 25). This gift was deposited in the father’s hands for
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future use in case of husband’s death or other needs, as this can be seen in the complaints of
Laban’s daughters, who blame their father for using their bride-money for himself (Gen.
31:15). On the contrary, in Pre-Islamic Arabia, bride-money was seen as ‘purchase price,’ as it
was paid to the male guardians such as father or brother or any other male relative.83 The advent
of Islam replaced the notion of bride-price with the idea of bride-wealth, which is under the
sole ownership of the wife. The mahr, therefore, is a bridal gift offered by the husband to the
prospective wife at marriage. Thus, mahr is considered to be an intrinsic and integral part of
any Muslim marriage.84
According to Harald Motzki (d. 2019), “Dower (bride-wealth) is a compensation for the
permission to have sexual intercourse.”85 Likewise, Kecia Ali holds that “jurists’ central idea
of marriage was that marriage contract granted a husband, in exchange for payment of dower,
a form of authority or dominion over his wife’s sexual and reproductive capacity.”86 According
to her, dower is a payment to obtain a right over a woman’s sexual organs. Paradoxically,
classical texts of Islamic law use such kind of language, i.e., “The full dower accrues to the
woman due to the intercourse, so in case, man divorces her after consummation, she is entitled
to receive one half of the dower, as held by Al-Shāfiʿī.”87 Such a view of Muslim marriage also
echoes within the Jewish marriage as purchase price due to the transfer of the financial
transactions to acquire rights over women. Contending against the view of dower as purchase
price at marriage, Greniman says,
Even though the transfer of money (dower) involves financial transactions and an
integral part of marriage, it is not to say that man was buying himself a wife or he was
her owner. It is also argued that mōhar was the price for the girl's virginity or a payment
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of compensation for the loss of her virginity. But, in reality, even the non-virgins were
paid a bride-price, though of a lower amount, indicates that payment of bride-price had
other functions of recognizing the value of women, as one party gaining and the other
was losing one's labour.88

On the other hand, the bride-price can also be seen from the perspective of customary practice.
Historian Grosz writes about the customary practices of bride-wealth among the people of Nuzi
in the second millennium BCE,
The transfer of bride-wealth is not considered a purchase. The transaction, even though
includes economic aspects, is not seen in the same manner as the purchase of
commodities or livestock, and a suggestion that woman is transferred as chattel is
considered offensive in certain societies, where bride-wealth is in practice. The
terminology used in the bride-wealth contracts does not include the words used for sale
and purchase.89
The noun form of the word, mahr in Arabic is used for gift, which becomes due to be given by
the husband to the wife on marriage. Muhūr is the plural of mahr, which stands for nuptial gift
or portion to the wife on account of the effect of marriage.90
“Thus, it is appropriate to hold that the transfer of bride-wealth falls within the realm of the
customary practice of giving gifts instead of sale/purchase.”91 It is plausible to hold that the
payment of mahr was a customary practice within marriage even before the advent of Islam.
However, this conventional practice of paying mahr (bride price) to the male guardians was
reformed through the Qurʾānic message of paying the bride-wealth to the woman herself (Q.
4:4). Mahr (dower) is a sum of money or property, by which the bride obtains sole ownership
through marriage. It does not proceed from the husband as a consideration for the contract of
marriage. Yet, it is considered as an obligation enforced by the law to show one's love and
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respect towards one's wife as marriage becomes valid even without the specification of dower
during the marriage.92

Kinds of Dower
Mahr Musammā: It is a specified dower, i.e., to say that the amount of dower is defined in the
contract of marriage.93
Mahr al-mithl: It is like a dower, in which the amount is unspecified.94 In such cases, the
husband offers the bride-wealth to his wife suitable according to her wealth, the social status
of her family, and her qualifications.95 Mahr al-mithl is applicable in all the circumstances
when the exact amount of bride-wealth is not stipulated.96
Prompt (muʿajjal) Dower: The verbal meaning in this context of the word muʿajjal is to hasten.
Therefore, the word muʿajjal means that which is executed promptly or preceded in priority in
terms of time. Prompt dower is due for payment to the bride immediately after marriage or
whenever she demands it.
Deferred (muʾajjal) Dower: There is a difference here from the above, and in this context, the
verbal meaning of the word muʾajjal is to delay or postpone. And here, the term muʾajjal means
that which is delayed or deferred. Deferred dower becomes due at the dissolution of marriage
either through divorce or death. While fixing the amount of dower, it is usually divided into
two parts as prompt and deferred, so that it becomes easier to distinguish between the two.97
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Qurʾānic Concept of Mahr
In the Qurʾān, four different words: ajr (reward), ṣadaqa (marriage gift), farīḍa (legal
obligation), niḥla (graciously) are used to define the concept of mahr (dower) at the marriage
in Islam. In other words, dower is an obligatory bridal gift or reward offered by the bridegroom
to the women graciously/with kindness, only within the context of marriage (Q. 4:4, 24, 25;
5:5, 33: 50; 60: 11). The word mahr is not used in the Qurʾān. However, the term mahr is
equated with the Qurʾānic words like ajr (reward), ṣadaqa (marriage gift), farīḍa (legal
obligation), as they are interchangeably used by the exegetes like Ibn Ashur (d. 1973), Rashīd
Riḍā (d. 1935), and others. Interpreting the Qurʾānic term al-ṣaduqāt, Ashur says that it is a
plural form of ṣaduqa with a ḍamma on the dāl, and al-ṣaduqa is mahr (dower) of a woman. It
derives from the term ṣidq (honesty) because it is a gift preceded by a promise of a giver to
give it, and he fulfils it.98 On this note, the Qurʾānic verse 4: 4 says, “Give unto the women
(whom you marry) gift of their marriage proportions.”99 This is an obligatory command to offer
the bride-wealth to the woman in marriage.
To emphasize the obligatory nature of dower and its necessity to be given to the woman in
marriage, Ibn Kathīr (d. 1373) interprets the verse 4:4, with a report of tradition from
Muḥammad ibn Isḥāq, which was passed on to him from the chain of narrators al-Zuhrī, ʿUrwa,
and ʿĀʾisha, saying, Niḥla is obligatory. Muqātil, Qatāda, and Ibn Jurayj stated that niḥla means
obligatory. Ibn Jurayj added niḥla is specified. Ibn Zayd said niḥla in the Arabic language
refers to what is necessary. This explains the mandatory nature of dower and God’s command
as to not to marry a woman unless her right of dower is granted to her.100 On the same note,
Sahl al-Tustarī (d. 896), while interpreting 4: 4, emphasizes the significance of dower to be
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given to women as a gift from God in equivalence to religion (diyāna).101 Similarly, for Ibn
Abbas (d. 687), payment of dower to women at marriage is an obligation imposed by God.102
However, the woman may remit or relinquish a part of the dower with her own free will. Thus,
4:4b says, “If women of their own accord remit unto you a part of dower, you are welcome to
absorb it.” The use of proposition min in verse implies that women may remit only part of the
dower but not the whole of it.103 Besides, this verse starts with a conditional clause in meaning
that remitting of dower is entirely dependent on the free will of the woman. On the same note,
Muḥammad ʿAbduh (d. 1905) says that there is no part for a man to take anything from a
woman’s dower or her property, except when he knows that she released it willingly. If he
asked from her part of it, which caused her coyness and fear of what is asked, then he is not
allowed to take anything of it.104 In other words, man cannot take any part of a woman’s
dower/property when he sees unhappiness or sadness on her face while remitting part of her
dower/wealth. However, some men allegedly intimidate the women into giving up their dower/
wealth and justify it by saying that women have released their dower/their share of the property
on their own accord.105
Moreover, even in the case of divorce, the Qurʾān says, “If you desire to take one wife in place
of another, even if you have given to one of them a great sum, take back nothing from it. Would
you take it by way of slander and manifest sin?” (4: 20). It is evident that man has no right to
take anything back from the woman when he divorces her. Rashīd Riḍā rightly points out that
man has no reason to justify his act of taking the property of a woman back. He cannot justify
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in saying that she has given it to him on her own; since divorce causes discord and sadness,
and there is no way that woman would give up her dower/property with her own free will when
she is distressed due to the divorce.106 Thus, if he takes anything from her, it is through slander,
which is sinful (4:20). Therefore, it can be said that the nuptial gift becomes the property of the
woman and has the absolute right over it, even at the dissolution of the marriage.107 And, if a
man divorces his wife before the consummation, then he must provide her with fair means
according to his resources, even when it is not specified.
In the case of designated dower, he has to pay half of the specified dower (2: 236 -237). The
Hidāya states that when the woman seeks khulʿ divorce through negotiation, she pays
compensation or gives the dower back to the husband to liberate her from wedlock. 108 This
ruling is based on the Qurʾānic verse 2: 229, “There is no blame upon the two in what she may
give in ransom,” meaning that there is no blame either in the husband’s acceptance of
compensation or wife’s giving of compensation to get freedom from her marriage.109 However,
it can be noted that even in such cases of khulʿ divorce, the woman pays compensation to the
husband on the assumption of her aversion towards him and not because of the husband’s
negligence or mistreatment. On the contrary, if a husband mistreats her or becomes the cause
for divorce, then he has no right to take anything (compensation/ bride-wealth) from her.110
This is explicit from the first part of 2: 229, “It is not lawful for you (men) to take aught from
what you have given (your wives), except that the two should fear they would not uphold the
limits set by God. So if you fear that they will not uphold the limits set by God, there is no
blame upon the two in what she may give in ransom.” Exception in verse 2: 229b concerns
khulʿ divorce initiated by the woman without any serious threat or mistreatment, wherein a
106
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woman wants to be free from her wedlock, and makes a negotiation with her husband to divorce
her with the payment of compensation or return of her bride-wealth.111 Thus, it is fitting to say
that the bride-wealth becomes the property of the woman. She continues owning it, even after
the dissolution of marriage. Although, there is an exception to it, in the case of khulʿ divorce,
when a woman seeks divorce from her husband without any valid reason, such as mistreatment
or negligence by him.112
In pre-Islamic Arabia, mahr was more of a purchase price paid by the husband to the guardians
of the girl, such as the father or male relatives. And the bride herself did not receive a penny
from it.113 It is interesting to note the claim of Spies that mahr was partly given to the woman
shortly before the time of Prophet Muḥammad. But with time, mahr, in its contact with the
Qurʾānic idea of ṣadaq lost its original meaning of mahr as a purchase price.114 This seems
entirely plausible due to the interchangeability of Qurʾānic term ṣadaq with the pre-Islamic
word mahr, but with the meaning of mahr as bride-wealth.
Motzki sees avoidance of mahr in the Qurʾān as a shift from the purchase price to bride-wealth
as compensation to the woman herself in obtaining her consent to have a sexual relationship.115
However, I do not think that the bride-wealth is any sort of compensation for seeking
permission to have sexual intercourse, as claimed by Motzki. I argue this due to the Qurʾānic
verse 4: 24; 5: 5, which exhibits the obligation of men to give bride-wealth to women as married
women and not as fornicators or as paramours.
Nevertheless, when Qurʾānic verse 4:24b (Those women whom you enjoy as a result of
marriage, give them their bride-wealth, as an obligation) is read in isolation, it might appear
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that the bride-wealth is compensation to enjoy sexual intercourse. The translation of the same
verse (4: 24b) by Sayyid Quṭb (d. 1966) is undoubtedly much more vivid, “To those with whom
you seek to enjoy marriage, you should give the dowers due to them.”116 This translation clearly
illustrates that the bride-wealth is not a compensation to obtain consent for sexual intercourse,
rather an obligation to hand over the nuptial gift to women as a requirement of marriage.
Moreover, it is clear that Qurʾān upholds sexual intercourse within the bond of marriage and
prohibits fornication, “Lawful unto you are all others whom you would seek in marriage with
gifts from your property, in honest wedlock and not in fornication” (Q. 4: 24a). To expound
the meaning of mahr and its relationship with marriage, Muḥammad ʿAbduh says, “al-ṣaduqāt
is the plural of ṣaduqa with a ḍamma on the dāl. There are other linguistic variants: of them is
al-ṣadaq, i.e., what is willfully given to the female before intercourse. This gift (ʿaṭāʾ) has a
greater meaning than the meaning of al-ṣadaq and al-mahr noted by so-called jurists as
compensations (ʿiwaḍ) for the marriage and the price of it. No, the bond (ṣila) between the
couple is higher than the relationship between a man and his horse or his slave girl. For this
reason, it must be noted that this gift is a sign among the signs of love, a connection between
relatives, and strengthening and consolidation of love and mercy. And it is absolutely
obligatory not to exhibit selectivity in it, as the one who buys something and the one who hires
people do. Indeed, it can be seen that the customs of people do not suffice with this gift; rather,
the husband compliments it with other gifts and presents.”117
The view of Muḥammad ʿAbduh makes it clear that the bride-wealth cannot be limited to the
idea of compensation for sexual intercourse. But it carries the much higher meaning of
exhibiting love and respect for the bride while establishing a marriage bond. Thus, the husband
not only pays customary dower to his wife but gives many other gifts and presents. Besides,
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even though mahr is considered to be a gift, the Qurʾānic concept of mahr is not purely a gift,
as a gift is given freely without expectation of anything in return and is not gifted as an
exchange for something else. Instead, mahr involves a mutual exchange of something between
two parties in the contract of marriage. Therefore, it appears to be more of an effect of a
marriage contract, spontaneous to the Qurʾānic injunctions, as claimed by Ashifa Quraishi
Landes.118

What does Ḥadīth119 say about Mahr?
We have seen in the Qurʾānic view of mahr that bride-wealth is obligatory on the part of the
husband, who freely hands it over to his wife as a sign of love and respect to enjoy the bond of
marriage. Even though the Qurʾān does not mention the minimum or maximum amount of
dower to be paid to the woman, it does suggest that those who divorce their wives should grant
them a fair provision according to one's ability (2: 237). It could imply that those men who
want to get into wedlock should provide the bride-wealth based on their richness. This further
becomes evident from the ḥadīth of the Prophet narrated by Sahl ibn Saʿd that a woman came
and presented herself to marry her. The Prophet did not want her in marriage. So one of the
companions of the Prophet said to him, “Marry her to me, O Allah’s Messenger.” The Prophet
questioned him, do you have anything? He said I don’t have anything. The Prophet said, “Not
even an iron ring.” He said, “Not even an iron ring, but I will tear my garments into two halves
and give her one half and keep the other half.” Then, Prophet said, “No. Do you know some of
the Qurʾān by heart?” He said, “Yes.” The Prophet said, “Go, I have agreed to marry her to you
with what you know of the Qurʾān.”120
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Two things are evident from this ḥadīth: Firstly, the nuptial gift to the bride is obligatory. The
dower might be any immaterial gain. For Instance, Anas narrated, “Abu Talhah married Umm
Sulaim and dower between them was Islam. Umm Sulaim became Muslim before Abu Talhah,
and he proposed to her for marriage. But she said I have become Muslim; if you become
Muslim, I will marry you. So he became Muslim, and that was the dower between them.”121 It
can be seen that any benefit, either material or immaterial like memorization of the Qurʾān, the
teaching of the Qurʾān, and the embrace of Islam can become dower, provided the women give
their consent.
Secondly, the husband has to offer the nuptial gift according to his ability, and there is no
minimum fixed amount of dower. If there is an excessive dower beyond one’s ability to pay, it
will bring distress to the poor man, and he will not be able to enter into wedlock. This could be
seen from the ḥadīth, in which ʿUmar ibn Khaṭṭāb said, “Do not go to extremes with regards to
the dowers of women if that were a sign of honour and dignity in this world or a sign of taqwa
before Allah. If that were to be the case, Prophet himself would have done it first. But he did
not give any of his wives, and none of his daughters were handed over more than twelve
Uqiyyah.”122 A man may increase her dower till he feels resentment against her by saying,
“You cost me everything I own or you bring me a great deal of hardship.”123 Thus, it is explicit
that dower, according to one’s ability, is better than inflated dower, as it causes pain and
resentment to the men, instead of mutual love and respect for one another. And we have seen
the view of Muḥammad ʿAbduh that dower and other gifts offered by husbands to the women
show the love and respect for the women. So, to show his love for his wife, he will try to give
the best possible dower or other presents to make her happy.
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There is also another ḥadīth about the amount of dowers given by the Prophet to wives. In this
narration, Abū Salāma asked ʿĀʾisha, "How much was the dower of the wives of the Prophet?
She said, “The dowers he handed to his wives were twelve Uqiyyah and a Nash of silver. A
Nash of silver is one half of Uqiyyah equivalent to five hundred dirhams.”124 This ḥadīth from
ʿĀʾisha, a Prophet’s wife, conforms to the ḥadīth passed on from ʿUmar ibn Khaṭṭāb that dower
should not be too excessive. However, it should be of a fair value based on the ability of a
person.
In case of a husband’s death after marriage, if there was no consummation and the dower was
not specified, in such circumstances, tradition says, “The dower and inheritance are hers, and
she has to observe the waiting period.” Such a ruling was passed by Prophet, as narrated by
ʿĀʾisha.125 Even though it does not specify the amount of dower and share of the inheritance,
it confirms the right and ownership of women over her dower and wealth of inheritance.
Likewise, the woman retains her dower even when her husband divorces her, except if she
initiates khulʿ divorce without any reason. This is obvious from the ḥadīth narrated by Ibn
ʿAbbās that Ḥabība bint Sahl, the wife of Thābit ibn Qays, came to the Prophet and said: “O
Messenger of Allah, I do not find any fault with Thabit bin Qais regarding his attitude or
religious commitment, but I hate kufr (she dislikes him and is unable to fulfil her duty as a
wife) after becoming Muslim.” The Prophet said, “Will you give him back his garden?” She
said, “Yes.” The Prophet said, “Take back the garden and divorce her once.” Interestingly, the
Prophet did not command her to give back the garden; instead, he asked her whether she would
give it back. It implies that she had the freedom to either retain or return it, but she chose to
give it back. This will be clearer from another ḥadīth with a different chain of narration, in
which Ḥabība bint Sahl says to the Prophet, “I cannot live with Thabit bin Qais (her husband),
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and everything that he gave me is with me.”126 It infers that she was ready to give up everything
she had received from her husband to get a divorce. Thus, the Prophet said to Thābit ibn Qays,
“Take it from her.”127
Besides, the issue of dower in khulʿ divorce, the subject of dower, also occurs in other instances
of dissolution of marriage through apostasy and liʿān (accusation of adultery without
witnesses). Concerning the payment of dower (mahr) in case of liʿān, it is crucial to see the
ḥadīth, in which Saʿīd Ibn Jubayr asked Ibn ʿUmar about the verdict on the matter of husband’s
accusation of wife for illegal sexual intercourse. Ibn ʿUmar said, “The Prophet separated (by
divorce) the couple of Banā Al-ʿAjlān, and told them, one of you is a liar, so, will one of you
repent? But both of them refused to do so. Thus, the Prophet separated them by divorce.” The
man said, “what about my money, which I have given to my wife as mahr?” The Prophet said,
“You have no right to restore any money. If you are speaking the truth, then you have
consummated the marriage with her. If you are lying, then you are less rightful to restore your
money.”128 In this narration, the accusation is unproven and doubtful, so the man has no right
to retain his money given as mahr. In other words, in the Instance of liʿān, the dubious
accusation of adultery is in favour of women, and man has no right to be entitled to any wealth
from his wife.
On the other hand, a woman may have to surrender her dower when she seeks khulʿ divorce
without any valid reason. Besides, even the apostate women were not obliged to return their
dower, as they had no obligation to abide by the Qurʾānic injunctions due to their disbelief.
Instead, the Muslim community had to pay Muslim men the amount equivalent of what they
had spent on their disbelieving women.129 Moreover, the Qurʾān commands men to deal with
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women justly in case of divorce. For Instance, Qurʾānic verse says, 33: 49, “If you marry
believing women and divorce them before touching them, provide for them and release them
in a fair manner.” Thus, it can be seen that the Qurʾān and Ḥadīth, two of the primary sources
of Islamic law, provide women with the rights of ownership of their wealth. However, the
implementation of their rights in practice is a question of debate, which will be further debated
in the paper with the analysis of court cases of dower from Indian British Courts.

Secondary Literature Review
The subject of Dower (Mahr) is an intrinsic part of marriage, which falls within Muslim
Personal Law. The Muslim Personal Law, as practiced in India, have been written down in
various books. Some of them are Muslim Law as administered in India and Pakistan by Kashi
Prasad Saksena, Macnaghten’s Principles and Precedents of Moohummudan Law, A Digest of
Anglo Muslim Law by Al-Haj Mahomed Ullah, Custom and Law in Anglo-Muslim
Jurisprudence by Hamid Ali, Neil Baillie's book titled A Digest of Mohummudan Law (In two
volumes), An Introduction to Hindu and Mahommedan law: For the Use of Students by
William Markby, Mahomedan Law Relating to Marriage, Dower, Divorce, Legitimacy and
Guardianship of Minors According to Soonnees (Tagore Law Lectures: 1891-92) by Mahomed
Yusoof Khan, The Hedaya: A Commentary on The Mussulman Laws, 2nd edition, translated by
Charles Hamilton, The Principles of Muhammadan Jurisprudence: According to Hanafi,
Maliki, Hanbali, and Shafii Schools by Abdur Rahim, Mohammedan Law in India and Pakistan
by Babu Ram Verma, etc. These are some of the books dealing with Muslim personal law, as
it was administered from the time of British Rule. Even though these books outline regulations
relating to dower, none of them discuss the subject in a way understood by Muslim jurists;
instead, the way the judges of colonial courts viewed the Islamic law during the period of
British India.
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Sabiha Hussain, in her research article, “Unfolding the reality of Islamic rights of women: Mahr
and maintenance rights in India,” explores the rights of Muslim women with the cases dealt by
Darul Qazas, the Sharia Courts, the state, and the legal system within the realm of the rights
of Muslim women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act of 1986.130 Unfortunately, she, too,
does not engage with the cases concerning suits of the women's rights from the colonial Courts.
Instead, she deals with the matters of women's rights based on her research through the
interviews of women who share the stories about their rights as being violated in a maledominated society. Sabiha Hussain also writes that the primary purpose of mahr is to protect
the woman against instant divorce used by men. However, she believes that law, in theory, is
not always consistent with its practice in the patriarchal society.131 Therefore, she concludes
her article by quoting a woman aged 38 years, who says, “This is a male-dominated society;
men since ages have always been more concerned about their rights by using religion for their
own convenience, especially in matrimonial matters, but forget religion when it comes to their
duty and obligation towards their women.”132 Likewise, Radhika Singh, in her study of Islamic
Criminal law, finds that the dominance of masculine authority was seen not only through
violence and injury against female relatives, but the legal system under colonial powers
strengthened the judicial competence of men over women.133 On the same note, Durba Ghosh,
in her investigation of the justice system, states that judges legitimized the sexual crimes of
European men against natives, and thus, reinforced the patriarchal dominance in legal matters.
However, it is distinct from the others, as it justified gender order based on race.134 Unlike
Sabiha Hussain, Radhika Singh, and Durba Ghosh, Lucy Carroll concludes that Colonial courts
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protected the rights of Muslim women, who otherwise are in a vulnerable position under
Islamic law.
Similarly, Muhammad Munir, in his discussion on ṭalāq al-tafwīḍ (delegated divorce) by
women as a stipulation in a Muslim marriage, holds that modern Islamic states are open to
adopting legislation to provide utmost protection to Muslim women against the arbitrary male
power in the juridical matters, which could be exemplified through the rulings of the colonial
courts in favour of women.135 By the same token, Sharafi makes final remarks that “The
colonial judges pretended to apply Anglo Muhammadan law as it appeared in their law books;
instead, they fashioned their own law in order to better the lot of Muslim wives.”136 In other
words, colonial judges departed away from the colonial legislation and Anglo Islamic law to
crystallize the rights of women against the excessive authority of men. She states that an
inflated dower is un-Islamic, according to Hanafi School, yet the judges ignored this law and
considered it reasonable. Thus, the judges pronounced rulings in favour of a high amount of
dower137 to protect the women against the arbitrary power of men to divorce them instantly.138
Besides, inflated dower, she too argues that ṭalāq al-tafwīḍ (delegated divorce) as a stipulation
in the marriage contract allowed the women to divorce their husbands without their consent.
The rulings in a matter of delegated divorce by women too favoured them as claimed by
Mitra.139 However, there were also instances wherein women could not seek divorce without
the man’s consent, except through apostasy for the dissolution of marriage.
Moreover, to obtain the permission of man to divorce, his wife decided to forgo her dower.
Therefore, it is vital to investigate two extreme narratives of court rulings; one in favour of
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men, and the other in support of solidifying women’s rights. Thus, the study will help arrive at
the definitive agreements as to whether verdicts on inflated dower often favoured the woman,
or it became the cause of her plight, as she surrendered her dower to acquire the consent of her
husband to divorce her.
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Chapter Two
Debates on Inflated Deferred Dower
The new judicial system introduced by the British became a thing of terror because of its
complications and the ignorance of the judges of both languages and customs of the country.
-Jawaharlal Nehru
The colonial court records between 1800 to 1939 in India show the existence of excessive
dower, which were usually paid at the dissolution of marriage to discourage divorce. Generally,
women filed suits in the court for the recovery of dower at the death of their husbands.
However, there were also few cases of lawsuits by women claiming their right to dower before
the dissolution of their marriage, which accrued due to the negligence, mistreatment, unethical
life of their husbands, and separation140 between them. Surprisingly, minimal cases of divorce
were reported in the court records. Does it mean that inflated dower payable at divorce was a
preventive measure against divorce? I will argue that inflated dower did not protect the rights
of women against divorce, undesirable marriage, and their right to dower at the dissolution of
marriage. To prove so, we shall firstly argue from the court cases that it was challenging for
women to prove divorce on the husband’s denial of divorce in order to avoid the payment of
dower. Secondly, it was almost impossible for women to get rid of their undesirable marriage,
as divorce was totally dependent on their husbands. Besides, the dower payable on the
dissolution of marriage did not guarantee women of their due right to dower, as they were either
deprived of their right to dower due to the failure in proving the claim of it or had to go through
a legal battle for long years against their children or the heirs of their husbands in obtaining
their right to dower.
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Did Inflated dower (Deferred) give protection to women against divorce?
To begin with, we shall first study the court cases between 1800 to 1864, as during this period,
Indian Muslim legal experts and Hindu Pundits assisted the colonial judges (mostly British) in
interpreting the laws concerning the suits brought by the Muslims and Hindus, respectively.
In my survey of 12 cases between 1800 to 1864,141 I came across only one example related to
dower and divorce. In this case of Mussummaut Kureem-Oonissa v. Ruheem Ali, the plaintiff
claimed her dower of Rs. 21,000142 on the allegation of divorce. The defendant denied having
divorced the plaintiff. He also mentioned that both were minors at the time of the marriage.
On coming of age, the defendant had not given his consent to the deed of dower. When asked
for a legal opinion, the legal expert stated that the guardian was not only required to be present
at the marriage of two minors but had to execute the deed of dower with his consent for its
payment. Besides, the defendant, on coming of age, had to give his consent to the deed of
dower. Based on the opinions of the legal expert, the plaintiff’s claim for dower was turned
down as the conditions for the recovery of dower were not met. 143 Though the verdict was
unfavourable to the woman, it complied with the opinions of the law officer. In this case, the
wife was helpless in obtaining her right to dower, as her husband had not acknowledged the
deed of dower on becoming an adult, and had refused to accept the allegation of wanting any
divorce. Even though the amount of dower was huge in this case, it did not protect woman
against divorce. The husband evaded his obligation of paying the dower, not only because his
guardian did not give his consent to the deed of dower, but also because he did not conform to
the act of dower on coming of age.
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Apart from the case of divorce, as mentioned above, there were two other cases in which
women brought their suits to recover their dower at the instance of separation between the
parties. In the case of Omduton Nissa Begum v. Mirza Asud Ali, the woman had brought the
suit against her husband to recover Rs. 20,000 from the whole dower of Rs. 100,015. The
excessive dower of Rs. 100,015 was a customary amount of the place and was registered in the
marriage contract. However, the marriage had taken place with the verbal pronouncement of
minimal dower of Rs. 500. The husband contested that amount of dower was Rs. 500, and not
the sum of Rs. 100,015, which was just a customary amount usually given in that district. On
being asked for the opinions of the law officers, the legal expert stated that the amount of Rs.
500 is the proper dower,144 and the more considerable amount is not illegal, even though,
according to some legal experts, it is improper to do so. Interestingly, in this case, the discussion
was about what should be the actual amount of dower and not whether her dower should be
paid only at the divorce or death of her husband. Here, the judges considered the written deed
of dower enforceable and passed a verdict in favour of the woman due to the specification of
the amount in the deed.145 However, even though the inflated dower was used as a device to
protect women against divorce, it was not favourable to the woman. For we see in this case,
that this woman demanded the part of the enormous sum of dower only because they were
separated due to some unknown reason. In this instance, the couple was not divorced but lived
separately. So, it can be said that even though exorbitant dower might have worked as a check
against men's power to divorce, but it did not protect women against unhappy marriage.146 In
another case of Noorunissa Begum v. Nawaub Mohsin Allee Khan, the wife sued her husband
on separation for the recovery of her dower of Rs. 60,000. The amount of dower was
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unspecified as to whether the amount of dower was prompt or deferred. However, it was also
customary in India to fix half the dower as prompt and the remaining half as deferred dower.147
Based on this customary practice, her husband argued that the law of limitation148 barred the
half of the amount of dower payable at marriage and the remaining was payable only on death
and divorce. The court sided with the argument of her husband and barred her from recovering
any amount of dower, as she failed to prove her claim of divorce.149 In this instance, the inflated
dower payable on divorce was not favourable to the woman, as she could not prove the divorce,
even though they were separated. The husband used colonial legislation of law of limitation to
avoid his obligation to pay the amount of dower payable at marriage or on demand. The
colonial legislation of law of limitation deprived Muslim woman of her right to dower, even
though in similar instances, Muslim legal experts were of the opinion that under Islamic law,
there was no time limit to claim one’s right to dower and was payable on demand. 150 We may
say that expensive dower payable on divorce might have prevented men from taking recourse
to divorce. Yet, it did not guarantee the felicity or bond of marriage, as the husband and wife
were living separately with no evidence of divorce.151 Besides, even if there was instant
divorce, it was tough for women to prove it when the husband denied it.
Bereft of the cases of dower arising due to divorce and separation, the women filed their suits
to recover their right to dower when they were mistreated or neglected by their husbands. In
the cases of Shekh Uzeez Oolla v. Ghufoor Beebee and Abdul Karim v. Mussummaut Fazilat
Un Nissa, two wives filed their suits in the courts against their husbands to recover their dower
of Rs. 550 and over Rs. 40,000, respectively. Both cases show that no dowers (prompt) were
paid at marriage, and the whole dower was left unpaid until divorce or death. However, in these
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instances, there was no divorce or death, yet they filed a suit against their husbands because
their husbands either mistreated them or neglected them. So, they demanded their rights of
dower, and law officers pointed to the obligation of these husbands involved to pay the dower
promised and the right of both women to ask for it until its payment. In compliance with the
opinions of the Muslim law officers, judgment was in favour of these women.152 Thus, from
the examples, it can be inferred that neither the minimal amount of dower nor the excessive
dower really protected the rights of women. It appears that excessive dower might put a check
against the arbitrary power of men to divorce, but not against his obligation to treat his wife
with love and care. This is evident from the above examples that even though there were no
divorces, mistreatment or negligence of the husbands existed, which eventually led the women
to demand their rights of dower. The verdicts in these two cases of dower were favourable to
women, as the judges complied with the laws expounded by the Muslim law officers. Yet, it is
evident that neither the minimal amount nor the maximum amount of dower could protect
women against the husbands’ ill-treatment.
Other than the cases mentioned earlier, the remaining seven suits were filed by the widows for
the recovery of their dower on the death of their husbands. Out of the seven claims for the
recovery of dower, only in the cases of Mussund Ali v. Khoorsheed Banoo and Wujih On Nisa
Khanum v. Mirza Husun Ali, the widows concerned were entitled to receive their husbands’
property in lieu of dower.153 In both these instances, the verdicts were passed in compliance
with the opinions of the Muslim legal experts. The judgments in conformity with the views of
the Muslim legal experts were much more favourable to women 154 than the verdicts based on
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the independent decisions of the colonial judges.155 In the remaining five cases, the widows
were deprived of their right to dower due to the failure in proving the claim of dower,156 the
objection by the heirs,157 the application of colonial legislation of law of limitation,158 and the
allegation that widows had remitted the dower.159 Thus, we can say that the amount of dower
payable on the dissolution of marriage through death did not guarantee widows of their rights
to dower. Moreover, the colonial justice system was complicated for women, as it was
challenging for them to prove their claim of dower. And the application of colonial law of
limitation on dower became a thing of terror for Muslim women, as it deprived them of their
right to the complete dower.160
In my survey of cases from 1800 to 1864, twelve cases in total, seven of them were filed by
widows to recover their dower at the dissolution of the marriage due to death. Does it mean
that excessive dower left unpaid till divorce or death prevented divorce and protected the bond
of marriage until the dissolution of marriage due to death? This is unjustifiable because
generally, more marriages last than break irrespective of the minimum amount of dower or the
excessive one. However, the rare phenomenon of divorce in the colonial court records does
indicate that it was extremely difficult for women to provide the evidence for divorce on the
refusal by the husband. Moreover, the divorce was dependent on men even when women
wanted to get out of undesirable marriage. Therefore, we have seen in the court records that
though there was a separation between husbands and wives, it was hard to provide evidence
for divorce.
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In the years between 1865 to 1939, too, the cases of divorce were extremely low in the court
records. Does it mean that not many divorces occurred? Can it be said that excessive dower
served as a device to protect women against the arbitrary power of man to divorce? This shall
be further investigated.
In one of the suits for the restitution of conjugal rights, the wife argued that her husband
divorced her instantly, and was adjudged that his claim for restitution of conjugal rights failed
due to the validity of divorce.161 This was an exception because it was often tough to prove the
claim of divorce. In another suit of the husband for conjugal rights, it was argued that the
husband had stipulated in their marriage contract to live in his father in law’s house. Besides,
the prompt dower was not yet paid, so he had no right for the restitution of conjugal rights.162
Moreover, the lawyer for the wife argued on the authority of Ameer Ali, “If it is agreed that a
husband shall allow his wife to live always with her parents, he cannot afterward force her to
leave her father's house for his own. However, if the wife once consent to leave the place of
residence agreed at the time of marriage, it is presumed that she has waived her right acquired
under the stipulation of marriage.”163 The argument was clearly in favour of the woman. But
the judges gave their verdict in support of the husband that non-payment of dower did not
suffice the evidence in the given case after the consummation of the marriage, and allowed for
the restitution of conjugal rights. The decision on the restoration of conjugal rights may be
based on Macaghten’s work, Principles of Mahomedan Law, as the judges quoted his work in
their discussion, “Under Islamic law husband acquires dominion over the person of his
wife.”164 Tahir Mahmood says, “The concept of restitution of conjugal rights is foreign to
Islamic legal ideology and has been engrafted by Anglo-Indian judicial decisions.”165 It can be
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seen that the understanding of Islamic law by British judges was very different than Muslim
jurist Ameer Ali, on whose authority a valid argument was made that Islamic law does not
favour one over the other. So, a wife cannot be forced against the agreed stipulation without
her consent.
In case of pleas for restitution of conjugal rights, the colonial judges usually gave verdicts in
favour of husbands. Nonetheless, if the wife were able to prove the cruelty of her husband and
the judges perceived that sending the wife to her husband would endanger her life, then they
would disallow the cohabitation.166 In one of the cases, a certain woman had refused to live
with her husband on the plea that he is keeping a mistress, he maltreated her and had not paid
her prompt dower. On the perception of threat to her life, the judgment was passed with
conditions: the husband could avail the restitution of conjugal rights only if he fulfils the terms
of paying her dower, keeping a mistress away from his house, and providing his wife with
residence and two servants (one male and one female) of her choice.167 The plea for the
restitution of conjugal rights by a certain husband arose when the wife refused to live with him
mainly because of the cruelty, mistreatment, negligence, non-fulfilment of the agreed
stipulation, and immoral life of the husband.168 In fact, such circumstances led her to demand
her prompt dower; otherwise, it was left to be paid at divorce or death of the husband. It is quite
evident from the case study that during the years from 1865 to 1939, when widows brought
their suits to recover their right to dower, the courts often passed verdicts in their favour, even
if the amounts were inflated.169 This was not the case in the years from 1800 to 1864, when
widows could be deprived of their claims to dower either because of the failure to prove the

166

Abdul Kadir, https://indiankanoon.org/doc/119342/.
Anis Begam v. Muhammad Istafa Wali Khan, ILR 55 ALL (1933), 774.
168
Ibid., 746.
169
Mussamut Bebee Bachun v. Sheikh Hamid Hossein, 10 Privy Council (1871), 55; Musammut Mulleeka, 375391; Majidmian Banumian v. Bibi Saheb, ILR 40 BOM (1915), 34-50; Zakeri Begum, 689-699; Hamira
Bibi,182-195; https://indiankanoon.org/doc/962828/; Umda Begam, 291-295.
167

45

claim of dower170 or implementing the stringent law of limitation.171 During this period,
especially up to 1862, the majority of the colonial judges were untrained lawyers with no
knowledge of either English law or Islamic law. We have seen that the British judges had biased
views about the opinions of the Muslim law officers, and thus, they had some Islamic legal
texts translated into English. Nonetheless, it was beyond their understanding to assess the
diversity of opinions found in Islamic law.
Moreover, they were utterly ignorant of the local laws of the natives. This made them
dependent on the opinions of the Muslim law officers to pass judgment on any given case.
However, the judges were independent in complying with the opinions of the legal experts in
passing the verdicts on any given case. One thing is evident from the case study that the
decisions based on opinions of Muslim legal experts were much more beneficial to Muslims
than the judgments bereft of legal opinions. But with the abolishment of the office of legal
experts in 1864, the natives could not avail the facility of legal opinions by the local legal
experts.
After 1864, the colonial judges used different classical legal texts of the Hanafi School, which
were translated into English to enable British judges to pass verdicts without any assistance
taken from the local legal experts.172 During this period, when women brought their suits to the
courts to recover their dower, their appeals were often dismissed because the common practice
of payment of dower in British India was either on divorce or death of husbands. For instance,
an old and respectable lady had brought her suit to the court to claim her dower on the allegation
that her husband married a younger woman and began to mistreat her. On her demand for
maintenance, he was enraged and divorced her. Through the process of investigation, the
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judges were of the opinion that there was no concrete evidence of habitual ill-treatment from a
respectable older man of a civilized society. They presumed that there was a probable discord
arising due to the natural love of a man for the younger and attractive wife, and there was no
divorce. Her plea for dower was dismissed, as she could not prove the alleged divorce.173
Likewise, another woman sued her husband to recover her remaining dower from the total
dower of Rs. 125,000. She alleged that her husband began to mistreat her from the time he had
an affair with another woman. She admitted to having received a substantial amount of dower
but claimed that the whole amount was prompt payable on demand. On the issue of a
considerable amount of property (about 72% of total dower) already transferred, the judges
adjudicated that even if her husband has taken a third wife, the amount discharged is to be
considered as prompt dower in the absence of expressed agreement, and her claim was
dismissed.174 The case study clearly shows that women usually sued their husbands for dower
either because they mistreated them or had contracted a second marriage. However, it was
extremely difficult for a woman to claim her total dower, which was usually paid at the instance
of divorce and death.
Moreover, we find that it was fiendishly difficult for a woman to prove the case of divorce in
order to recover her dower. The husband could easily deny his pronouncement of instant ṭalāq
to escape from the obligation of paying the dower. Besides, the power to divorce was
unjustifiably dependent on the husband, and the woman was helpless, even if she wanted to get
rid of her bond of marriage. In my opinion, the helplessness of a woman to divorce and the
unwillingness of a man to divorce to escape the dower were two significant reasons for the
limited cases of divorce. Therefore, in view of the aforementioned observation, we shall
attempt to discuss the helplessness of women to divorce and the men's role in obtaining a
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divorce. Our primary concern with such an investigation is to address the question, whether or
not excessive dower protects women against undesirable marriage.

Did Inflated Deferred Dower Protect Women Against Undesirable Bond of
Marriage?
According to Hanafi law, an adult Muslim woman is entitled to get into marriage at her will,
but her authority to get rid of an unhappy marriage is extremely difficult. She may initiate khulʿ
divorce through negotiation with her husband in return for compensation, but this is possible
only on the consent of the husband to execute it. Of course, the law provides other possibilities
for women to obtain a divorce at the instance of their husband's failure, either at the
maintenance of his wife or at his impotency. Any minor, who was given in marriage by anyone
other than her father or grandfather, can seek divorce at the time of attaining the age of
adulthood. However, these possibilities of divorce were to be obtained from the Muslim qāḍī
through the application of Islamic law. Unfortunately, the colonial courts in British India did
not have such provisions specifically for Muslim judges.175 Thus, a woman’s power to divorce
was exceedingly limited. The only other possibilities left for women were the ability to divorce
on authorization (delegated divorce), and apostasy, which terminated the marriage
automatically. We shall next investigate into court cases of delegated divorce, khulʿ divorce,
and apostasy to know if women were protected against unhappy marriages.
Through the survey of cases occurring after the 1860s, we find that there were rare cases of
delegated divorce (ṭalāq al-tafwīḍ), whereby Muslim women could specify in a marriage
contract that she will be allowed to divorce herself under certain contingencies. Some of these
contingencies included that their husbands should not take in a second wife during the lifetime
of their married life176; the husband should not mistreat or beat her without reason and should
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pay her monthly maintenance as specified etc.177 According to the law, when the husband
delegates his wife the authority to divorce during the majlis (meeting during which delegation
is authorized), she must use her delegated authority to divorce in the majlis as soon as she
knows of the stipulated conditions breached. If she delays in exercising her authority to divorce
for a day or more, she loses her authority, except if the husband lays down additional
statements, such as “divorce yourself when you want or whenever you want.” In case of such
additional stipulations, the wife is authorized to exercise her power of divorce without the
majlis, and the husband has no authority to revoke his given authorization.178 The law allowing
women to use the power to divorce was very stringent, as they had to use it immediately on
knowing any breach of conditions. However, in my survey of cases related to delegated
divorce, I found that colonial judges did not consider the stringent time limit given to women
in executing divorce reasonable. Instead, the judges’ opinion in one of the cases was, “when a
woman is given the power to divorce herself on her husband’s second marriage, she is not
bound to exercise her authority as soon as she knows of the offense. The injury inflicted on her
continues to exist, and so it is reasonable to hold that she continues to have her right in order
to exercise her power.”179 In the case of delegated divorce by women, colonial judges favoured
women and ignored the Islamic law of imposing a strict time limit in exercising such authority.
Therefore, it cannot be denied that delegated divorce did protect some women against the
cruelty, mistreatment, and negligence by their husbands, as they could use their power to free
themselves from an unhappy marriage. Unfortunately, such cases of delegated divorce were
minimal. It may be implied that most people were unaware of the law of ṭalāq al-tafwīḍ, and
such practice was perhaps prevalent only among few elites and educated people. Rightly,
Muhammad Munir points out that even today in the Urban areas of Pakistan, the practice of
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authorizing women to divorce (ṭalāq tafwīḍ) is prevalent in meager numbers, even among
highly educated and elites. Surprisingly, in Islamabad, amid the mixed population of the middle
class, rich, elites, and educated people, the concept of ṭalāq tafwīḍ is generally unknown.180
The extremely low number of cases of ṭalāq tafwīḍ in modern times implies that the practice
of authorizing women to divorce might have been a very rare phenomenon among some elites
and educated people during the British rule of India, as then, people were even less educated
and were unaware of their rights. Hence, it is plausible to hold that the practice of ṭalāq tafwīḍ
protected only a scarce number of Muslim women and not their general population.
Besides, ṭalāq tafwīḍ, Muslim women had limited options to seek divorce as compared to men.
The Hanafi law allowed women to avail of divorce through the judicial process only in case of
the impotence of the husband. The other option was to seek khulʿ divorce, for which women
negotiated with men to divorce them in exchange for compensation. However, even this option
favoured the man more than the woman, for he could either force a woman to surrender her
whole dower or refuse to pronounce ṭalāq. For instance, a certain man married the rich widow
with a promise that he will leave his first wife. After his second marriage, he began to torture
his first wife so that his wife initiates khulʿ divorce by renouncing her right to dower. He
continued mistreating her with cruelty, not allowing her to see her mother and refused to
provide her with maintenance. At last, he was successful in obtaining the execution of khulʿ
divorce with the use of force and forgery. When the first wife brought her suit for the recovery
of her dower on the allegation that the husband divorced her and khulʿ divorce was obtained
through force and forgery, he refused to own up for his divorce but khulʿ divorce on her
initiation. The deed of khulʿ was found to be with fraud, and the verdict was passed in favour
of women allowing her right to dower.181 In this case, even though the judgment favoured the
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woman, but it exposes that men could easily misuse the option of khulʿ divorce to their own
advantage, either by forcing women to seek divorce or giving their consent for khulʿ divorce
on the forfeiture of complete dower by women. Hence, it can be implied that when the khulʿ
divorce was unfavourable to women, the only option available for them to dissolve their
marriage was apostasy.182 From the early twentieth century, we begin to see cases of apostasy
by Muslim women to get rid of their undesirable marriage. According to Hanafi law, if one of
the spouses apostatized, the marriage was dissolved automatically.183 In one of the cases dating
1910, a Muslim wife converted to Christianity to dissolve her marriage, and the husband
brought a suit to the court demanding the restitution of conjugal rights. The lawyer for the
husband argued, relying on the work of Ameer Ali, the learned jurist. According to Ali, in such
matters, diverse opinions existed among jurists on the effect of marital status due to apostasy.
His statement clarified that the jurists of Bokhara took a narrow understanding of the law. In
contrast, the jurists of Balkh and Samarkand pointed out that when a Muslim woman converts
to scriptural religion like Judaism or Christianity, her marriage remains undissolved. However,
the judges dismissed this view and passed judgment in favour of the dissolution of marriage
due to apostasy.184 Similarly, in the year 1913, a Muslim husband had approached the colonial
court to appeal for the restitution of conjugal rights, when he was denied of his cohabitation
with his wife by his in-laws on the ground that she had become an apostate. The judge
demanded for the fatwā from the jurist to know about the status of his marriage. The husband
sought the fatwā from mawlānā Ashraf ʿAlī Thānvī (d. 1943), who gave his ruling that the
marriage was dissolved due to apostasy.185 M. K. Masud states that the apostasy of women was
not seen as a threat to Muslims initially, including Thānvī. However, the number of Muslim
women’s conversion to Christianity increased in the 1920s and 1930s, as apostasy was the only
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means to escape their unhappy marriage. Moreover, the colonizers encouraged suffering
women’s conversion to Christianity as a part of their missionary activity, particularly in
Punjab.186 At the same time, there were reform movements initiated by women themselves. In
the year 1929, the resolution was passed by the All India Women’s Conference, which
demanded the Government to look into the matter of Muslim women’s right to inheritance,
polygamy, and their right to divorce in particular.187 Such a reform initiative by women might
have brought awareness to women folks about their rights. When there were no means available
to dissolve their marriage through judicial legislation, they were perhaps forced to take an
extreme step of apostasy to do so. Zaman states that, according to Thānvī, thousands of women
apostatized to end their marriage; however, the exact number is unknown.188 Such conversions
became a matter of great concern for the Muslim scholars, as the British judges passed verdicts
in favour of apostasy to end the marriage. Surprisingly, I have not come across any case of
apostasy, in which British judges asked the women the motive behind their apostasy. M. K.
Masud rightly says, “British judges discouraged investigations into whether conversions in
those cases were genuine or not.”189 In contrast, Indian judges sometimes did try to prove the
genuineness of a woman’s apostasy. Interestingly, in one of the cases, Lala Ghanshyam, a
Hindu judge of the district court in Layllpur, asked an apostate Muslim woman to eat pork in
the court to prove the genuineness of her conversion. She willingly accepted the offer to eat
pork in court. However, when the pork was presented to her, she refused to eat it. When she
declined to eat the pork, the district judge declared her conversion invalid by saying, “I am
quite convinced that she is simply telling lies in order to secure the annulment of her marriage
under the influence of her love for some other man and that she has not given up her Islamic
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religion.”190 It shows that judges in the lower courts who were mostly natives knew much better
than British judges about the cultural and religious practices of native Indians. In the case
mentioned, it was most likely that the judges knew that apostasy was not genuine, but a device
to escape an undesirable marriage. However, in the higher court, the English judge declared
her conversion genuine and asserted with emphasis, “Even the devil himself knoweth not the
heart of man. Renunciation of one’s faith, therefore, requires no other proof than a person’s
declaration.”191 Moreover, the conversion from Islam to Christianity was seen by British judges
as an act done in good faith (bona fide).192 It can be implied that for English judges, the motive
of Muslim woman’s conversion was immaterial, and they encouraged such conversions.
Therefore, it is quite obvious to hold that if British judges did not care to know the motives
behind Muslim women’s apostasy, then how they would even work to better the lives of
Muslim women when they did not know their real pain and suffering. It appears that British
judges’ encouragement to apostasy was a waking call for Muslim scholars to bring reformation
in Islamic law to protect the rights of women. We have seen that Muslim women took an
extreme step of apostasy to get out of their undesirable marriage. It clearly shows that no
amount of dower could protect women against their undesirable marriage unless it was backed
by mutual love and respect.
A well-known Muslim jurist, Thānvī might have regretted his first fatwā on the dissolution of
marriage due to apostasy, as he reissued his fatwā in his lengthy Urdu treatise, al-Ḥīla al-Nājiza
li-l-Ḥalīla al-ʿĀjiza (The Lucrative Judicial Tactic for Powerless Wives) in the year 1933. In
this fatwā, he asserted that apostasy of a Muslim wife did not dissolve the marriage, and she
had to reconvert to Islam and remarry her previous husband.193 Instead, he opined that Hanafi
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law allows the muftiyūn to take recourse to Maliki School to dissolve the marriage in case of
utmost necessity. He agreed that Muslim women could ask for judicial divorce due to the failure
of the husband in his marital obligations of maintenance, long absence, cruelty, mental
instability, and so on.194 However, such judicial divorce was possible only at the discretion of
Muslim qāḍī. In the absence of Muslim quḍāt in colonial courts, muftiyūn were of the opinion
that undesirable marriage could also be dissolved by the quḍāt of Muslim ruled princely state
of Bhopal (outside British India). For the application of Islamic law in a strict manner, an appeal
was made to the Muslims that they demand the Government for the appointment of Muslim
judges in the courts.195 To bring about reform in Islamic law, Deobandi ʿulamāʾ showed unity
despite their political differences. Ḥusayn Aḥmad Madanī, who was the leader of nationalist
ʿulamāʾ and lived in Medina for several years, assisted Thānvī in his reform movements by
obtaining fatāwā from Malikis of Medina. Finally, ʿulamāʾ’s reform efforts through the call of
Jamʿiyyat ʿUlamāʾ al-Hind for the legislation of Islamic law was brought into enactment as the
Dissolution of Muslim Marriage Act in 1939. This Act did not fulfil the special demand of
Muslim judges in colonial courts. Still, it brought about a reform in the Islamic law of divorce,
whereby apostasy was no longer legitimate for the dissolution of marriage and provided
Muslim women several grounds for juridical divorce.196 Some of the grounds on which Muslim
woman could seek divorce through the legal process were: the unknown absence of husband
for more than four years, husband’s failure for her maintenance up to two years, imprisonment
of a husband for over seven years, impotence, insanity for two years and any other lethal
disease, habitual mistreatment, and immoral life, etc., which was otherwise extremely difficult.
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Moreover, according to this Act, a woman’s right to dower does not get affected by the
dissolution of marriage.197 Therefore, I do not think it is appropriate to hold the view that British
judges worked to better the lives of Muslim women. Instead, it is plausible to hold that the
distortion of Islamic law by British judges and the women’s call for the protection of their
rights triggered Muslim scholars to bring reformation in Islamic law of marriage. Such a call
for reform in Islamic law through its enactment not only made the dissolution of marriage
easier but also confirmed women’s right to dower even at the termination of the marriage.
Furthermore, it can be implied from the case study that it is not the inflated dower payable at
divorce that protects the bond of marriage, but the prevalence of love and respect that unites
spouses in their marital life.

Social Dynamics Around Dower
We have already seen that divorce was mostly dependent on the husband, and it was difficult
for women to prove it even when the husband refused to admit it. Hence, it will be interesting
to investigate the social dynamics between women and their husbands or relatives or heirs in
the determination of the dower and the recovery of it.
In the case of Noorunissa Begum v. Nawaub Mohsin Allee Khan, the wife sued her husband on
separation for the recovery of her dower of Rs. 60,000. The amount of dower was unspecified
as also whether the amount of dower was prompt or deferred. The whole amount was left to be
paid at the dissolution of marriage. However, when separated, she claimed to recover her
dower. In defence, her husband argued that the law of limitation barred the half of the amount
of dower payable at marriage and the remaining was payable only on death and divorce. The
court sided with the argument of her husband and barred her from recovering any amount of
dower, as she failed to prove her claim of divorce.198 In another case, the widow sued her
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husband’s heir to recover her total dower of Rs. 80,000 from the property of her late husband,
which was under the ownership of the heir. One-third of the amount was fixed as ‘prompt,’ and
the remaining two-thirds were deferred payable on divorce or death. However, the prompt
dower was left unpaid. Therefore, she claimed for the recovery of her whole dower. But the
court allowed her to recover only the deferred dower and barred her from the recovery of her
prompt dower due to the lapse of time of 40 years after the marriage, even when the Muslim
legal expert argued that the prompt dower unpaid at wedlock was equally recoverable at the
death of her husband.199 In India, it was a general practice to keep the prompt dower outstanding
until the dissolution of marriage to discourage divorce. But the Privy Council’s stand on prompt
dower was different. The Council had opined that the prompt dower need not be demanded
during the continuance of the married life of spouses, as such demand could destroy the
domestic felicity between husband and wife. However, the Council was also alarmed at the
danger that if prompt dower was not paid within the fixed period during the lifetime of the
husband, the heirs could falsely plead that the lapse of time barred the woman’s right to her
prompt dower.200 It is evidently clear from the cases as mentioned above that it was not only
the husband, but heirs used the colonial law of limitation to deprive the women of their rights
to prompt dower, which, in fact, was payable on demand and was not barred by lapse of time
according to the Muslim legal experts.
In the case of Beebee Saheebun v. Beebee Hingun and Beebee Boodhun, the daughters (Beebee
Hingun and Beebee Boodhun) took possession of their late father’s estate. Their mother, now
widow, claimed her unpaid dower of Rs. 35,889, but was dismissed by the court due to her
failure to produce the evidence against her daughters, who claimed that their late father had
already paid her mother’s dower of 10 dirhams.201 In another instance, the court refused the
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widow to take possession of her late husband’s property in satisfaction of her dower due to the
objection brought by the heirs of her late husband.202 It appears that it was not so easy for
women to recover their right to dower not only during the lifetime of their husbands but also
after their death. On husbands’ death, they had to battle for their rights to dower against their
own children or the heirs of their husbands or relatives through judicial procedures.
It cannot be entirely denied that the court did grant women their rights to dower in some cases,
but their rights to dower were not easily obtainable. In the case of Wujih On Nisa Khanum v.
Mirza Husun Ali, one of the heirs (the brother of the deceased) brought a suit against his late
brother’s widow in the district court. He claimed his share in his brother’s estate, which was
under the ownership of the widow to satisfy her unpaid dower. The heir pleaded that the dower
was too excessive and illegal. Then, legal opinion was sought by the judge. In response, the
legal expert stated that “the right to dower precedes right of inheritance; that, if the dower of
the wife exceeds the whole estate left by the husband, his heirs have no claim at law.” 203 The
judge complied with the opinions of the Muslim legal expert and dismissed the heir’s claim for
his inheritance.
Unsatisfied with the verdict, the heir appealed to the Provincial court. The court gave its ruling
against the opinion of the law officers and asked to reduce the excessive dower. It also directed
the claimant and other heirs to receive their share of inheritance from the property acquired by
the widow in lieu of her dower.204 The widow was not satisfied with the decision, so she
appealed to the higher court of appeal (Sudder Diwani Adalat). The widow pleaded that even
though the respondent called himself a Sunnī Muslim, he was a Shīʿī Muslim. She argued the
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respondent has no right to inherit as an heir based on the Shīʿī code of law and his conversion
to Hinduism.
On the other hand, the respondent challenged the legality of excessive dower and claimed his
right to inherit as an heir. When asked for opinions from the Muslim legal experts, they opined
that the excessive dower is improper but not illegal. The recovery of dower from the property
of the husband precedes the claim of any heir. According to the Shīʿī code of law, the brother
of the deceased does not inherit anything if there is a widow with her daughter.
Furthermore, in the case of apostasy, the brother of the deceased does not stand as an heir
because his late brother was Muslim and died as a Muslim. Apart from the brother of the dead,
no other heirs objected to the ownership of the property by the widow, and the reason for
excessive dower did not make it illegal. Therefore, the court gave judgment in favour of the
widow and dismissed the claim of the respondent.205 This case was first filed in the district
court in the year 1794; by the time the widow won her right to dower in the higher court of
appeal, it was already 1808. It took her almost 14 years to rightfully own the property of her
husband in lieu of dower through legal legislation.206
In the case of Zakeri Begum v. Sakina Begum and others, the widow (Plaintiff) had first filed
a suit in the provincial court of Patna against her late husband’s nephew and other relations as
heirs (defendants) to recover her deferred dower of Rs. 50,000. The defendants alleged that the
amount of dower was Rs. 5,000, and had already paid during the lifetime of her late husband.
Besides, they claimed that marriage took place in Lucknow under the jurisdiction of Oudh and
if the amount was Rs. 50,000, it was too expensive, and the court could reduce the amount
based on the position of the husband. To support the claim of the plaintiff, ten witnesses were
called, out of which seven of them had witnessed the marriage. All of them testified that the
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amount of dower was fixed at Rs. 50,000. The given amount was a minimum dower of the
family, and her sister had received a much higher amount of dower. Besides, a copy of the
marriage register with the amount of dower was presented in the court. The pleader on behalf
of the defendants objected and asked the court for inspection on the allegation that the amount
registered was Rs. 5,000, but was modified to Rs. 50,000. One of the witnesses representing
the plaintiff looked at the document and said the original amount of Rs. 50,000 was changed
to Rs. 5,000. Amid this debate, the original register was presented in the court, which proved
that the amount written in the record was Rs. 50,000, which had been later altered.
For the defendants, among four witnesses, three were said to have attended the marriage. One
of them was nephew to the deceased, who claimed that his uncle told him of having paid the
dower amount fixed at Rs. 5,000. The servant of the deceased also gave his testimony, saying,
“I do not know the position of the plaintiff. I saw her house. It was in a very dilapidated state.
Her dower was fixed at Rs. 5000.”207A professional storyteller was also called in to provide
evidence, who said that the fixed dower was Rs. 5,000. He also said, “The imam asked the
plaintiff’s husband at marriage, the dower of your wife is Rs. 5,000; do you agree to this? The
husband replied, ‘I agree.’ The other witness, too, claimed that the dower amount was Rs.
5,000.”
On examining the shreds of evidence presented by both the parties, the subordinate judge gave
his conclusive verdict saying, the amount of dower was fixed at Rs. 50,000. It was within reach
of the deceased, so the amount was not excessive based on his position, and the law of Oudh
was no way to be applied in the given case.208 Dissatisfied with the verdict, the defendants
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brought the suit to the High Court, and the judges reversed the decision of the subordinate judge
without verifying the evidence of the case.
Finally, the plaintiff had to appeal it to the Privy Council at the decree of the High Court in the
year 1886. The lordships studied all pieces of evidence presented in the case and complied with
the decision of the subordinate judge. They reversed the verdict of the High Court in the year
1892.209 The plaintiff had first brought her suit to the provincial court in the year 1883. After a
long battle for about nine years, she finally obtained her right to dower through juridical
legislation from the highest court of appeal, the Privy Council. The dower in India was often
left unpaid until the dissolution of the marriage. However, even after the dissolution of the
marriage through death, it was extremely difficult for widows to obtain their rights to dower
from the property of their husbands due to the claims made by other heirs of their rights in the
property. Moreover, the heirs could manipulate the case to make it difficult for widows to attain
their rights to dower. Furthermore, when these helpless widows received their right to dower
through judicial legislation, it took them long years of over nine or more for the final justice.
Such kind of legal battle for widows was probably equivalent to ‘justice delayed is justice
denied.’
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Chapter Three
Violations of Islamic Law
The assumption that the law of Islam is incapable of developing and expanding on the lines of
justice, equity, and good conscience, is no less danger for the Muslim community as a whole.
-F. B. Tyabji
The chapter will discuss some of the violations of Islamic law like the precedence of custom
over the law, interest on dower, and the colonial law of limitation on dower. We will argue that
the release of dower as a religious or benevolent act and the divorce due to caste discrimination
were influenced by the cultural practices of India, were not within the spirit of Islamic law of
equality and justice. Similarly, the application of interest on dower and law of limitation were
based on the colonial legislation of British India. We shall assert that practices like the release
of dower as a meritorious act, caste discrimination, and rigorous application of the law of
limitation could deprive women of their rights to dower.

Precedence of Customs over Law
In one of the cases, Nurunnessa Khanun, a widow of high rank, had released her dower on the
death of her husband as her female relatives told her to do so in place of mourning and weeping
at her husband's death. It was duty-bound to release the dower of her husband as a religious
act. Moreover, she did it because she knew from her family custom that the release of dower
was considered to be a virtuous act.210 The concept of dower release as a meritorious act
appears to have been influenced by the Hindu custom of Sati performed by the Hindu widow
at her husband’s death. Interestingly, there is another similar instance of a Muslim woman who
gave up her right of dower at the deathbed of her husband. She renounced her right of dower
due to the belief of her sick husband, that if he died without paying the dower debt, he would
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not attain salvation. Her husband was a pious man and was anxious that he should be freed
from all the obligations before his death. So, she released the ownership of her dower for the
religious benefit of her husband, as it was also considered to be a benevolent act.211 In both
cases, widows had released their dowers against their husbands, as it was considered a
meritorious act in their society to free their husbands of all their obligations before or at their
death. Nevertheless, after the demise of their husbands, both of them approached the court to
demand their right of dower, and verdicts were passed in their favour. In the former case, the
judgment favoured the widow, as she was not a free agent to make a deliberate judgment in
giving up of her right to dower since she was saddened at the loss of her husband and was
mourning. In the latter case too, the verdict came in favour of the widow on the basis that she
was still a minor (15 years), according to the Indian Majority Act,212 when she released the
ownership of her dower. However, according to Islamic law, she was no longer a minor at the
age of fifteen, as she had already attained puberty.213 The judges in the colonial courts did not
always follow Islamic law, even when it was explicit in the texts of Islamic law. Nevertheless,
the apparent common factor prevalent in both the cases was that the widows’ giving up of their
dower was influenced by customary practices with a certain amount of coercion. Thus, there
was no free agency in decision making.
Moreover, dower is an obligation accorded by law in a contract of Muslim marriage, and it
becomes a woman’s right; however, she may release it of her free will.214 In the cases seen
above, the release of the dower by two different widows was not completely done out of one's
free will; it was somewhat influenced by the customary practice of releasing dower, which was
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seen as a benevolent act. Besides, both widows were requested by the family members and the
husband, respectively, to free their husbands' obligation of paying dower.
The release of dower seen as a meritorious act is purely customary practice because such a
view is absent in the Qurʾān, Ḥadīth, and the texts of Islamic law. Instead, we have already
discussed about the obligatory nature of dower from the perspective of the Qurʾān and the
Ḥadīth, and they entail that mahr is freely handed over by the man to woman as a sign of love
and respect in a bond of marriage. Though we do not have many cases of this sort, whereby the
release of dower is seen as a benevolent act, it is plausible to hold that such practice did exist
among some Muslim communities. Surprisingly, these two cases come from two distinct courts
of Calcutta and Madras, respectively. But the details about the place of their residence are
absent in the case description. Therefore, it may be inferred that both widows either belonged
to one region or completely distinct region, but launched a suit for dower in the High Courts
belonging either to their own province or different provinces. Nevertheless, the practice of
releasing dower by a woman seen as a benevolent act with religious significance might have
existed among some Muslim communities, even though such action is not prescribed by Islam.
In the discussions of customs or cultural practices among Muslim communities in India, there
is another notable case of Qasim Husain Reg v. Bibi Kaniz Sakina,215 which highlights the
practice of the caste system. Sakina (plaintiff) had first filed a suit against Reg (defendant) to
recover half of her dower due to divorce with no consummation. Reg, then, appealed to the
court against Sakina. The defendant claimed that he wanted to reject the marriage because his
wife’s maternal aunt was of a lower caste. Moreover, he claimed that the khulʿ divorce was
executed for the relinquishment of the whole dower, which she refused to admit. In defence,
he argued that there was an agreement of khulʿ divorce by the wife, which was mediated
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through the plaintiff’s father in the presence of maulvīs (from the Arabic mawlawī, learned
teacher of Islamic law).
The case turns out to be a complex one due to the discussion of the judges on the validity of
the khulʿ divorce and relinquishment of dower, because she was a minor according to the Indian
Majority Act, but was an adult according to Muslim personal law, as she had attained the age
of puberty. Though judges often took into consideration the Indian Majority Act to determine
if a person is a major or minor, in this case, they opined that a person who is a minor under the
Indian Majority Act but is a major according to Islamic law could relinquish the dower for the
purpose of obtaining khulʿ divorce. This was argued on the ground that even if a person who
is a minor under the Indian majority Act can marry but not fix the amount of dower. This was
not a valid argument because here, in reality, they are following Islamic personal law,
according to which she was already a major and had the capacity to seek khulʿ divorce with the
consideration of dower. On the other hand, they went against the law of the Indian Majority
Act, which they were supposed to comply with. Thus, it can be seen that there were
inconsistencies and conflicting approaches of the judges towards the laws pertaining to
Muslims and Hindus of India.
The court dismissed Sakina’s reclaim for dower on the ground that she claimed for the dower
after three years of divorce, which should have been done during the period of ʿidda.216 The
question here is not about the lapse of time in reclaiming the dower, but the way the khulʿ
divorce was obtained. According to the law, the khulʿ divorce is initiated by a woman to seek
the consent of her husband to divorce her in exchange for compensation. However, if the man
becomes the cause of hostility leading to khulʿ divorce, he has no right to take any
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compensation from her.217 In contrast, in this case of Qasim Husain Reg v. Bibi Kaniz Sakina,
it appears that there was coercion on Sakina for khulʿ divorce by Reg, as he wanted to get rid
of her due to her affiliation with the lower caste.218 Surprisingly, there is no discussion on the
cause of divorce by the judges in the court. Moreover, the defendant Reg accused Sakina's
father of fraud and misrepresentation by hiding the caste identity, and thus he declined the
claim for any dower. I do not think that hiding one’s caste was a fraud, as Islam does not believe
in the caste system or racial discrimination; rather, it upholds equality of all humankind before
God. On the subject of equality in the Qurʾān, Noah Feldman says that “The concept of Equality
is not systematically treated in the Quran, but the equality of persons before God is an
ideological tenet, which is explicit in the Quranic texts.”219 One of the sermons attributed to
Prophet Muḥammad evidently speaks against the hierarchy based on ethnicity, “No Arab is
superior over non-Arab, nor non-Arab over Arab. And no White is superior over Black nor
Black over White” (ḥadīth N. 23489).220 Even though Islam is against the superiority of one
ethnicity over another or caste system, it is evident from the case of Qasim Husain Beg v. Bibi
Kaniz Sakina that though the defendant was a Muslim, he believed in the Hindu caste system
rather than the Islamic principle of equality. In case of divorce without consummation, thereby,
the plaintiff was entitled to half the dower of the total amount. But the defendant refused to pay
any amount of dower through his coercive negotiation of khulʿ divorce, which was a clear
violation of Islamic law.
In this case, it can be seen that the Qasim Reg gave precedence to the cultural practice of the
Hindu caste system over the Islamic principle of equality. Besides, the judges appear to favour
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the defendant rather than the plaintiff. Even though the judges, namely Suleiman and Iqbal
Ahmad, were Muslims, they did not object to the caste system. Instead, it is more likely that
they too belonged to a higher caste like that of Qasim Reg and favoured him because of
probable belief in the caste system. Chandrachud rightly points out that even though some of
the Indian judges were British-trained barristers, their belief in the caste system did not
disappear entirely.221 The case implies that the caste system did exist among some Indian
Muslims during the colonial period and does continue to exist even today. For instance, Stalin
K., in his documentary, “India Untouched: Stories of a People Apart,” narrates the stories of
Muslims from the States of Bihar and Jharkhand. Muslims recount that sheiks and imams are
of the higher caste,222 and they do not allow Muslims of lower caste to enter their houses.
However, they allow all Muslims to pray in the mosque due to the fear of God. Here, Muslims
experience oneness only in the mosque, but once they step out of the mosque, they encounter
inequality and caste discrimination. Besides, there are separate graveyards for Muslims based
on their caste.223 Stalin also recounts a saying of an elderly Muslim, “There is no caste
discrimination in Islam, but there is among Muslims.”224 However, in the case of Qasim Reg
v. Bibi Kaniz Sakina, one may argue that just with one example related to divorce due to caste
discrimination, how you can generalize its practice among Muslims during the colonial period.
Here, this one case of divorce due to the caste system evidently proposes that the Muslims of
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lower caste hardly came to the courts to seek justice,225 and thus, it does not rule out that such
practice did exist. Even though caste discrimination is against the Islamic ethos of equality,
one of the rarest cases of divorce due to caste in the court records shows the traditional practice
of the Hindu caste system even among Muslims.

Interest on Dower
In one of the cases, a Muslim widow named Zubaida Bibi had owned her husband InayatUllah’s property in place of dower. However, in the absence of any agreement to recover her
dower debt from the profits of her husband's estate, she claims to acquire this compensation in
the form of interest on the dower. On the other hand, Hamira Bibi, a plaintiff, who is a sister
of Inayat-Ullah, brought the suit to the court to recover her share of inheritance from her
brother’s estate, which was legally possessed by the widow for her dower. Plaintiff claimed
that the defendant had already recovered her dower debt through her ownership of the estate
for 14 years and was willing to pay the amount of difference remaining of the total dower. The
Subordinate Judge dismissed her appeal on the ground that the defendant was rightfully in
possession of her husband’s estate in satisfaction of her dower. So, she was granted the right
of interest to be paid on her dower at the rate of 6 percent per annum. Unsatisfied with the
judgment, the plaintiff appealed to the larger bench of judges in the High Court to question the
validity of the dower together with interest.
In the full bench of judges, one of them was Sundar Lal (with maulvī Abdul Raoof) for the
plaintiff.226 Sunder Lal argued on behalf of the plaintiff, saying that Islamic law does not allow
interest, and thus, no Muslim can claim for interest on dower. In defence, Mr. W. Wallach
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(with maulvī Muhammad Ishaq) counter-argued on behalf of the defendant, saying that Islamic
law was not applicable in case of dower, as Muslim marriage is valid even without it. Therefore,
he argued that this case of dower would be judged not based on Islamic law but rules of equity,
justice, and good conscience. Moreover, the woman as a regular creditor has every right to
claim for interest in any transaction.
Another judge Karamat Husain, taking into consideration the arguments for and against interest
on dower put forth by the judges as mentioned above, gave his views on the issue of interest
on dower. In one of his arguments, he said, “The rules of the court based on equity justice and
good conscience, apply the Hanafi law with the rule of equity, justice, and a good conscience;
and when it is applied to Muslims concerning pre-exemption or gift, the dower-debt due to
Hanafi wife does not carry any interest.”227 However, the judge considered this argument
unsound based on the quotes of the Muslim jurist and judge, Ameer Ali,

Dower is a debt like all other liabilities of the husband and has preferences over legacies
bequeathed by the testator and the rights of the heirs. A partition of the estate cannot take
place until the dower debt has been satisfied. When the wife is alive, she can recover the
debt herself from the estate of her deceased husband. If she dies, her representatives stand
in her place and are entitled to recover the same. Dower is a debt due to the wife by the
husband, whether it be a prompt or deferred dower.228

Surprisingly, the judge argued that no interest on the dower debt, according to Islamic law, was
unsound based on the quotes from Ameer Ali, even though he did not say that interest on dower
was permissible. Instead, he stated that the dower is debt to be paid by the husband. In other
words, dower is the obligatory payment to the wife, and in case of non-payment, she has the
right to claim it lawfully from the estate of her husband. Her right of dower from her husband’s
estate takes precedence over the rights of other heirs. It appears that the judge Karamat Husain
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thought dower is a debt in terms of debtor and creditor in business transactions (because of the
mention of dower being a debt like any other liabilities of the husband), rather than an
obligation of the husband in a marriage contract. There is nothing from the statement of Ameer
Ali to validate the permissibility of interest on dower, as claimed by the judge. Besides, Ameer
Ali says, “The widow’s claim for dower is an only debt against the husband’s estate and has
priority over legacies and heirs. However, she has to take the possession of husband’s estate
lawfully in satisfaction of her dower, and she will be entitled to retain possession until the debt
is satisfied with the usual liability for the account to the heirs”.229 From this, it is evident that
the widow can retain the husband’s property in the satisfaction of her dower till its complete
payment; however, no statement of Ameer Ali justifies the payment of dower from the interest
on the property held in a place of dower.
Further, the judge Karamat Husain said that in case of dower payment based on the principle
of equity, justice, and good conscience, he would be the last person to deprive the Muslim
widow of interest on her dower to her advantage because of her helpless situation. 230 Finally,
he is of the opinion that
Dower is a debt, and as debt, it is to be governed by the Municipal law of British India
and not Hanafi law. It would be extremely inequitable to make a Muslim widow in
possession of her husband's property in place of dower liable to account for the profits
of the property without giving her a right to claim interest upon her dower. The rulings
which are in favour of interest, he would without the least hesitation hold that a Muslim
widow in possession of her husband's estate in lieu of her dower claim interest on it,
and the courts in British India should not grant her a decree on the ground that Islamic
law forbids usury.231

The chief justice Stanley and judge Banerji agree with the opinion of Karamat Husain on
allowing interest on dower, dated 11 August 1910. In the year 1913, with the decrees of the
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High Court of Allahabad, the plaintiffs appealed to the Privy Council on the contention whether
interest should be allowed on the amount of dower during the period of a widow’s possession
of her husband’s estate in lieu of dower.232 On the arguments of whether a Muslim widow
should be allowed interest on dower, the lordships referred to the case of 1868 concerning
Woomatul Fatima Begum v. Meerunmunnissa Khanun.233 According to this case, the plaintiff,
who had owned her husband’s property in lieu of dower, was deprived of it by order of the
court. So, she brought a suit against one of the heirs to recover a proportionate amount of her
dower. In defence, the defendant argued that she should account for her dower from the profits
of the estate during her possession of it. While analyzing this case, the bench of chief justice
Barnes Peacock and other judges Jackson and Macpherson remarked that the plaintiff did not
demand interest on her dower, but the profits of her husband’s estate might not have been given
to her to account for the amount of her dower during her possession. Further, it was discovered
that the amount incurring through the reasonable interest was more than the annual rents and
profits of the estate. Thus, the lordships thought that it would be unjust not to allow her interest
on her dower to recover her amount of dower. They allowed the plaintiff to recover her dower
through interest on her husband’s estate and prohibited the recovery of dower through the
profits of the estate, with their consideration of being it just and in accordance with the law. In
the case of Hamira Bibi v. Zubaida Bibi, the defendant was allowed by Indian courts to account
for her dower through the interest on her husband’s estate at the rate of six percent per
annum.234 Here, the lordships did not find any reason not to allow interest on dower and
dismissed the case for the contention that no interest should be permitted on dower, as dated
30 May 1916. It is evident that both judges in the colonial courts and lordships of the Privy
Council did not always follow the Islamic law pertaining to the cases of Muslims in India,
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whenever they thought that Islamic law did not stand to the rules of equity, justice, and good
conscience. It could also imply that they thought of Islamic law differently and gave preference
to the Municipal law of British India over Islamic law, even when dealing with cases of
Muslims.
Similarly, there is another notable case of Maina Bibi v. Wasi Ahmad dating to 12 March 1919.
In this case, the widow, Maina Bibi, was in possession of her husband’s property in lieu of
dower, and Wasi Ahmad and other plaintiffs brought a suit into the court with the claim of their
share of inheritance as heirs from the property held by Maina Bibi. According to the judge, it
was held that Wasi Ahmad and others as heirs could not prove their relationship with the
deceased. So, the judge gave his verdict in favour of the widow that the property of her husband
was possessed by her not as a gift, but in lieu of dower and should be allowed three percent
interest per annum on her husband's property to account for the dower.235
The glaring difference between the two cases as mentioned above of Hamira Bibi v. Zubaida
Bibi, and Maina Bibi v. Wasi Ahmad was that in the former case, it was challenged in the court
of non-permissibility of interest on dower according to Islamic law; whereas in the latter case,
there was absolutely no discussion about the rule of Islamic law on the matter of interest, as
the plaintiffs themselves did not demur it in the court proceedings. The difference of years
between these two cases is about three years. It can be assumed that by then, Muslims knew
that there was no use of challenging court's rulings regarding interest on dower based on Islamic
law, as the judges of the colonial period did not give heed to Islamic law on non-permissibility
of interest in any transactions; instead, they preferred the municipal law of the land over Islamic
law. Thus, allowing interest on dower was a clear violation of Islamic law. It implies that
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allowance of interest on dower was seen at par with interest on any business transactions in
colonial courts of India.

Application of Law of Limitation236 on Dower
A widow, Doordana Khatoon, had brought a suit in the provincial court of Patna to claim the
recovery of her dower-debt from the property of her husband, a large share of which was owned
by the son of her husband. She claimed to recover the whole of her dower, one-third of which
was payable at marriage (Prompt dower), and the remaining two-thirds was to be paid at the
death of her husband (Deferred dower). In consultation, the law officers opined that according
to Islamic law, there was no time limit to claim one’s dower, and both prompt and deferred
dower were payable on demand. However, according to the opinion of the city judge, the law
of limitation restricted the payment of prompt dower. Nevertheless, in this case, he said that a
limit of twelve years should be counted from the death of her husband and not from the date
on which the execution of deed took place at marriage.237 Thus, the judge gave his verdict in
declaring that the widow had the right to recover her entire dower from her husband's property.
However, the verdict of the city court was modified by the Sudder Diwani Adalat. In its final
judgment, only two-thirds of dower (deferred) was payable, and one-third of dower (prompt)
was barred due to the lapse of twelve years, as dated 21st August 1805.238 Likewise, in one of
the judgments dating back to 1841, a Muslim wife was barred from the recovery of any amount
of dower on the ground that the law of limitation restricted the recovery of prompt dower due
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to the lapse of time. Besides, her claim for deferred dower was rejected due to the lack of
evidence of their divorce, even though they lived separately.239 However, in the case of Ameeroon-Nissa v. Moorad-oon-Nissa,240 a Muslim widow took possession of her husband’s estate
to satisfy her dower. During the lifetime of her husband, she never asked for her dower. The
court held that the widow had the right to retain her husband’s property to satisfy the amount
of her dower claimed. Besides, the court decided that the woman did not need to demand dower
during the lifetime of her husband. Therefore, even though the time of the deed settlement had
passed over twelve years since its claim, the law of limitation was not applied from the time of
the deed of dower, but from the time she claimed for her dower at her husband’s death.241
Likewise, in the case of Musssamut Mulleeka v. Mussamut Jumeela, a Muslim widow
(Jumeela) had married Syud Mahomed in the year 1833. After living together for three years,
they were separated due to disputes between them. At her husband’s death in 1854, the widow
acquired her husband's property in lieu of dower, and the suit was brought before the court in
the year 1860. In defence, it was argued on behalf of the defendant (Musssamut Mulleeka) that
the widow was divorced, and all her dower was prompt, which should be barred due to the law
of limitation. However, the claim of divorce was conflicting, and the time for the payment of
dower so as to whether it was ‘prompt’ or ‘deferred’ was not specified. So, the court held that
the law of limitation for prompt dower begins to run from the time of its demand and not from
the time of its deed. Hence, the widow was entitled to her full dower.242
In the cases of Meer Nujib Ollah v. Musssummaut Doordana Khatoon and Noorunissa Begum
v. Nawaub Mohsin Alee Khan, prompt dower was disallowed due to the law of limitation,
whereas, in the cases of Ameer-oon-Nissa v. Moorad-oon-Nissa and Musssamut Mulleeka v.
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Mussamut Jumeela, it was allowed on the ground that the law of limitation for prompt dower
begins to run from the time it is demanded and not the time of settling the deed at marriage. In
the former instance, it was unfavourable to the rights of women, whereas in the latter case, it
did favour women. Nevertheless, it was not in accordance with Islamic law, for it does not
recognize the time limit for the recovery of one's dower. Concerning the payment of dower,
Ashraf ʿAlī Thānvī (d. 1362/1943), one of the renowned Islamic scholar of the Hanafi School,
says that the general practice of payment of dower among Indian Muslims was either on divorce
or after the death of one of the spouses. During the continuity of the marriage, neither husbands
paid the dower, nor the wives asked for it.243 In the cases discussed above, we have seen that
generally, women filed suits to recover their dower at the death of their husbands or on the
ground of divorce. Thānvī also says that in case of a general practice of paying complete dower
at divorce or death, the husbands’ obligation of paying prompt dower at marriage does not
apply. However, the wife is entitled to claim it until its payment through the refusal of sexual
intercourse.244 We have seen that when a husband died without paying the amount of dower
that is due, the wife took possession of her husband’s estate in lieu of dower. Besides, it was at
divorce that she claimed her dower. As per the practice of dower payment in India, the whole
of the dower was usually paid at the dissolution of marriage. Therefore, in no way, the prompt
dower (payable at marriage or on demand) was barred by lapse of time and was recoverable at
divorce or death according to the Muslim jurists like Thānvī. Moreover, we have seen the
opinions of Muslim legal experts in the court records of colonial India that there is no time
limit to recover the whole amount of dower according to Islamic law. Though the Muslim
jurists of all the four schools of Islamic law accept the law of limitation on civil matters,245 the
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application of the law of limitation on dower in the Indian colonial courts was based on colonial
legislation and not the Islamic law that deprived the rights of women of their whole dower.

Conclusion
Through the survey of dower related cases, it is quite evident that the price of dower was
inflated throughout the period from 1800 to 1939. In India, the common practice of payment
of dower to the woman was either at divorce or death of the husband. Nevertheless, in the cases
of mistreatment, second marriage, negligence, and immoral life of the husband, the women
demanded from their husbands their rights to dower. From the court cases taken from the period
from1800 to 1864, two wives filed their suits against their husbands for the recovery of their
dower amounting to Rs. 550 and over Rs. 40,000, respectively. The lawsuit arose not because
of the divorce, but because of their husbands’ mistreatment or negligence. When legal experts
were sought for their opinion, the law officers opined that husbands must pay the dower as
promised, and it is also the right of women to ask for it until its payment. In compliance with
the opinions of Muslim law officers, judgments were in favour of women.246 However, the
cases of dower arising after 1862, in particular after1864, in similar situations of husbands’
mistreatment or second marriage, when women sued their husbands for dower, they were
barred from their claim of total dower without divorce or death of the husbands. During the
lifetime of their husbands, they could claim only for unpaid prompt dower, unless they were
divorced. Even the unpaid prompt dower was often barred due to the rigorous application of
the law of limitation by colonial judges. Besides, it was challenging for women to get out of
their undesirable marriage, as the divorce was dependent on men. The only way left with
women to dissolve the unhappy marriage was apostasy, which was on the increase during the
1920s. And, it was encouraged by the colonial judges, even though Hanafi law allowed to take
recourse to Maliki School to dissolve the marriage only in case of utmost necessity. However,
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such judicial divorce was possible only at the discretion of Muslim quḍāt, which could not be
availed in the colonial courts.247 Thus, the helplessness of women amplified not because of
Islamic law being unfavourable to them; instead, it was hostile because of the way the colonial
judges applied it. Moreover, the abolition of the office of Muslim legal experts from the
colonial courts in 1864 deprived Muslim women not only to avail the interpretation of Islamic
law but to benefit from the diversity and flexibility of Islamic law. Besides, the British
understood Islamic law very differently. Kugle says, “In the eyes of British, the interpretation
of law violated the very ethos of Islamic law, which had been defined as static, unchanging,
waiting only for the fair application.”248 Likewise, Kozlowski rightly said, “British Judges
identified the Quran and the Sunnah (example) of the Prophet and the writings of the Muslim
religious scholars as the sources of Islamic law. While the scholars of Islamic law of the eighthninth centuries became ‘legal authorities,’ Muslim counterparts of Coke and the Blackstone.
Written treatises of these religious scholars became the ‘legal textbooks’ and their fatwas
(opinions) ‘precedents.’”249 Such view of Islamic law as being fixed and static is evident in
the statement of the Privy Council that if the rulings are to be applied from the classical legal
texts commentaries of ‘great antiquity and authority,’ in such case, even without being
specialized in Islamic law, anyone with his training in British law would be able to apply
them.250
After the removal of Muslim legal experts from the courts, colonial judges applied the written
legal texts without even understanding the spirit of Islamic law. For instance, in one of the
court cases from the first part (1800-1864), the husband argued that the wife’s demand for
dower arises only on the occasions of divorce or death. When opinions were sought, the Muslim
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legal expert gave his opinion saying, dower must be paid immediately on demand, unless the
contrary was specified in the marriage contract. Here, the Muslim law officer did not emphasize
whether the dower was prompt or deferred. Instead, he declared that it must be payable on
demand if it is not specified in the contract.
In contrast, in the cases of dower arising after 1864, the colonial judges were independent of
the Muslim legal experts and emphasized on distinguishing between prompt and deferred
dower. The British judges adjudicated that deferred dower must be paid only on divorce or
death. Generally, it was the suffering women who claimed for dower before divorce or death.
But, whenever these suffering women sued their husbands for the recovery of their dower,
judges barred them from their whole dower, unless they were able to prove the divorce.
Sometimes, the judges also banned them due to the law of limitation, which was applied based
on colonial legislation. In fact, they always linked the dower to divorce. However, the idea that
inflated deferred dower was fixed to prevent divorce does not fall within the spirit of the Qurʾān
and the tradition of the Prophet, as it is not maintenance to be given at divorce or death. Instead,
the mahr is an obligatory payment of husband to his wife, which is given to her freely as a
result of marriage. It is evident from these cases that British judges did not really work to better
the lives of Muslim women, and it was not always the case that excessive dower was in the
interests of women, as posited by Sharafi. While the inflated deferred dower may make the
divorce an expensive affair for the husband, it does not guarantee his love and care for the
woman. One of the Hindu judges, Krishna Iyer, has said it very aptly about mahr,
The quintessence of mahr, whether it is prompt or deferred, is clearly not a
contemplated qualification of a sum of money in lieu of maintenance upon divorce.
Indeed, dower focusses on marital happiness and is an incident of conjugal joy.
Divorce is farthest from the thought of the bride and the bridegroom when mahr is
promised. Moreover, dower may be prompt and is payable during marriage and cannot,
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therefore, be a payment for divorce too distant and unpleasant for the bride and
bridegroom to envision on the marital bed.251
Though the expensive dower may be a preventive measure against instant divorce, it does not
guarantee a woman against husband’s mistreatment, negligence, and instant divorce, as it might
be rarely paid. Moreover, in case of instant divorce, the husband can easily deny his
pronouncement of instantaneous triple ṭalāq to avoid the payment of dower. The fixation of
inflated dower is not the best solution to restrict rash divorces, as it is rarely paid. Moreover,
inflated dower can be oppressive to the husbands and the heirs. Tyabji remarked that “excessive
mahrs are often oppressive to creditors and unfair to heirs, especially to children of predeceased
wives.”252 He also believed that the frequent practice of a high amount of dower existed in
India as a mere form to show one's reputation, even if the amount was beyond the reach of
husbands. The fixation of high dower payable at divorce or death is not the best of solutions to
prevent instant ṭalāq. Thus, there have been other measures taken to restrict the arbitrary power
of men to use instant divorce. For instance, in the year 1961, Pakistan introduced reforms on
instant ṭalāq to limit the arbitrary power of men to divorce under Muslim Family law Ordinance
1961. According to this Ordinance, the instantaneous triple ṭalāq is ineffective in Pakistan and
also in Bangladesh, formerly East Pakistan, which was separated from West Pakistan after the
Indo-Pak War in 1971.253 For the last few decades, progressive Muslim women and the victims
of instant ṭalāq in India have been demanding reforms in the Traditional Muslim Personal law,
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which validates instant triple ṭalāq. But the Muslim clerics in India have been very reluctant to
bring about changes in the legislation of triple ṭalāq. Tahir Mahmud, the legal expert on Muslim
law, has been very vocal about the misuse and misinterpretation of Islamic law by Muslim
leaders and clerics in India. In one of his interviews with the news media, he said, “Ignorance,
obstinacy, blind belief in religion and morbid religiosity are undoubtedly the reasons why
Muslims clerics in India are resistant to change in the Traditional Muslim Personal law.”254 In
the absence of reforms in the legislation of instant triple ṭalāq by the Muslim Personal Law
Board of India, and the inaction of the Muslim clerics to reform the traditional law led the five
helpless Muslim women (victims of instant ṭalāq) to file a plea in the Supreme Court of India
(Highest Court of Appeal) to ban instant triple ṭalāq. In the year 2017, the Supreme Court
passed the judgment terming instant ṭalāq unconstitutional,
Given the fact that Triple Talaq is instant and irrevocable, it is obvious that any attempt
at reconciliation between the husband and wife by two arbiters of their families, which
is essential to save the marital tie, cannot ever take place. This form of talaq is
manifestly arbitrary in the sense that the marital tie can be broken capriciously and
whimsically by a Muslim man without any attempt at reconciliation to save it. This
form of talaq must, therefore, be held to be a violation of the fundamental rights
enshrined in the Indian Constitution.255
Many Muslim women in India have been advocating for a ban on instant ṭalāq, as Muslim men
often misuse it, and it is the woman who suffers the most. Therefore, there is not only a need
for reforms in the law of instant ṭalāq but also a need to educate people about their rights to
equality and justice sanctioned by the Qurʾānic teaching and Islamic law. For Taslima Yasmin,
a scholar of law from Bangladesh says even though reforms have been made under Muslim
Family Law Ordinance to restrict the arbitrary power of a man to divorce, the majority of

254

This is taken from the interview of Prof. Mahmud with the news media: accessed 11 July 2020,
https://scroll.in/article/724902/ban-triple-talaq-and-abolish-muslim-personal-law-board-says-former-minoritiescommission-chairman.
255
Shayara Bano v. Union of India and Others, Supreme Court of India (2017), accessed 11 July 2020,
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/115701246/.

79

Muslim women from rural Pakistan and Bangladesh think that new provisions in the legislation
of instant ṭalāq are un-Islamic, and they are to be ignored.256
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